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in  the  Macro  Model 
THE  ANTICIPATIONS of households and firms played a  central role in 
Keynes'  General  Theory,  and  in the thinking  of every  macro  theorist  since. 
My purpose  in this paper  is to examine  the major  new issues  about antici- 
pations  raised  by the recent  explosion  of theoretical  and empirical  work 
based  on the theory  of rational  expectations. 
In the General  Theory,  anticipations  were  taken,  in general,  as irrational 
in the sense  to be defined  below.  Because  they existed  in the mind, antici- 
pations  were analyzed  in psychological  terms.  They were determined  by 
the "animal  spirits"  of businessmen,  by speculators'  guesses as to how 
other speculators  would behave,  by waves of optimism  and pessimism. 
Changes  in anticipations  were  held to be frequently  or even usually  self- 
fulfilling. 
After  World  War  II two developments  led economists  away  from  reliance 
on psychologically  determined  anticipations.  First,  the effort  to build and 
estimate  quantitative  models  of the business  cycle involving  expectational 
variables  forced  acceptance  of the idea of anticipations  functions  formed 
on observable  data,  because  without  them such  models  could  not be esti- 
mated  and  empirically  tested.  It was natural  to argue  that anticipations  of 
Note: I am indebted  to Costas Azariadis,  Herschel  I. Grossman,  Christopher  Sims, 
Jerome Stein, and my discussants  and other participants  in the Brookings panel for 
many useful  comments  on earlier  drafts of this paper.  Research  support  was provided 
by the Federal  Reserve  Bank of Boston; I especially  appreciate  the assistance  of Amy 
Norman  of the Bank's  staff. Of course, neither  the Federal  Reserve  Bank of Boston nor 
any of those who assisted me necessarily  agrees with either the opinions expressed  or 
the analysis  in this paper. 
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the value  of some variable,  X, depend  on recent  experience.  The assump- 
tion most often employed  was that the anticipated  value of X equals a 
weighted  average  of past values  of X, with higher  weights  applied  to the 
recent  past than to the distant  past. Most writers  recognized  that these 
functions  could  not be strictly  correct  because  information  other  than  that 
captured  in the  past  history  of a variable  must  affect  anticipations.  But  they 
were thought to  be serviceable  approximations,  especially when they 
yielded  good fits in estimated  models.' 
The second significant  development  was a running  controversy  over 
whether  speculation  in an individual  market  was stabilizing.2  In the litera- 
ture, general  agreement  emerged  that, except in pathological  cases, eco- 
nomic theory  implied  that speculation  ought to be stabilizing.  Profitable 
speculation  had to be stabilizing;  and unprofitable  speculation,  while  not 
necessarily  destabilizing,  would  reduce  the  resources  available  to those  who 
systematically  made  poor bets. 
Disputes  over  the empirical  validity  of the theoretical  presumption  that 
speculation  is stabilizing  spurred  the early  statistical  studies  of speculative 
markets.  Most  of the  studies  concentrated  on the  stock  market,  but  markets 
in bonds, commodities,  foreign exchange,  and stock options were also 
analyzed. 
While this mass of statistical  results was growing-most of it incon- 
sistent  with  simple  notions  as to how destabilizing  speculation  might  affect 
prices in speculative  markets  an initially underappreciated  paper was 
published  by John  Muth.3  Muth  argued  that  a theory  of anticipations  ought 
to assume  rational,  maximizing  behavior.  Given,  in principle,  an objective, 
discoverable  model of the market-an uncertainty  model with a specified 
stochastic  structure-the trained  economist  or statistician  would base his 
forecast,  or anticipation,  of the value of a variable  X by calculating,  say, 
the minimum-variance  unbiased  forecast  implied  by the model. Muth as- 
1. Meanwhile,  survey information  on the spending plans of firms and households 
has continued  to be of interest,  especially  for short-term  forecasting.  Some surveys  in- 
clude questions  attempting  to measure  "mood," or feelings of "optimism"  or "pessi- 
mism,"  and so are psychologically  oriented  in the sense intended  above. 
2. Keynes seems to have assumed  as self-evident  the proposition  that stock-market 
fluctuations  were  the result  of destabilizing  speculation.  "Day-to-day  fluctuations  in the 
profits  of existing  investments,  which are obviously  of an ephemeral  and non-significant 
character,  tend to have an altogether  excessive,  and even an absurd,  influence  on the 
market"  (emphasis  added).  John Maynard  Keynes,  The General  Theory  of Employment, 
Interest  anid  Money  (Harcourt,  Brace, 1936),  pp. 153-54. 
3. John F. Muth, "Rational Expectations  and the Theory of Price Movements," 
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serted  that rational  agents  in the market  did the same: that the market's 
anticipated  value of X equaled  the model's expected  value of X-"ex- 
pected"  in the statistical  rather  than  psychological  sense. 
In the late 1960s  Muth's  paper  was used  to lay a theoretical  foundation 
for the continuing  statistical  studies  of price  behavior  in speculative  mar- 
kets. The careful  development  of the theory of "efficient  markets"  by 
Eugene  Fama and others generalized  Muth's fundamental  contribution, 
suggesting  new hypotheses  to test and motivating  new statistical  work. 
This  work  strengthened  the case  for Muth's  theory.  In the opinion  of most 
economists  familiar  with this literature,  the argument  that speculation  is 
highly  irrational  and destabilizing  has been demolished.4 
In a different  line of literature,  starting  in the late 1960s  with the work 
of Friedman  and Phelps,  economists  began  applying  the rational-expecta- 
tions theory  to macro  problems.5  The initial  attack  was on the then gen- 
erally  accepted  proposition  that the long-run  Phillips  curve  is negatively 
sloped.  Friedman  and Phelps  argued  that anticipations  of price  and wage 
changes  would eventually  catch up to realized  price and wage changes. 
Since  behavioral  functions  depend  on real  rather  than  nominal  magnitudes, 
a permanently  higher  rate of inflation  cannot  "buy"  a permanently  lower 
level  of unemployment.  The observed  short-run  Phillips  curve  must,  there- 
fore, arise  from short-run  discrepancies  between  anticipated  and realized 
inflation.  One need apply  only a very weak  form of the rational-expecta- 
tions hypothesis  to infer  that inflation  cannot  be under-  or overestimated 
year  after  year  after  year. 
When  the rational-expectations  hypothesis  was applied  more rigorously 
by Lucas,  the effect  was to eliminate  the distinction  between  the short and 
long runs in macro models.6  Because  rational  forecasting  requires  that 
forecast  errors be serially uncorrelated,  and because above- or below- 
4. The efficient-markets  literature  is so large  that I will cite only three  general  sources; 
extensive  bibliographies  appear in each: Paul  H. Cootner, ed., Thze  Random  Character 
of Stock Market  Prices (M.I.T. Press, 1964);  Eugene  F. Fama, "Efficient  Capital Mar- 
kets: A Review  of Theory  and Empirical  Work,"  Journal  of Finance,  vol. 25 (May 1970), 
pp. 383-417;  C. W. Smith,  "Option  Pricing:  A Review,"  Jolurnal  of Financial  Economics, 
vol. 3 (January/March  1976),  pp. 3-51. 
5. Milton Friedman,  "The Role of Monetary  Policy," American  Economic  Review, 
vol. 58 (March  1968),  pp. 1-17; Edmund  S. Phelps,  "Introduction:  The New Microeco- 
nomics  in Employment  and Inflation  Theory,"  in Phelps  and  others,  MicroeconomicFoln- 
dations  of Employment  and  Inflation  Thieory  (Norton, 1970). 
6. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric  Testing of the Natural Rate Hypothesis,"  in 
Otto Eckstein,  ed., The  Econometrics  of Price Determination,  A Conference  Sponsored 
by the Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System  and Social Science  Research 
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normal unemployment was hypothesized to depend only on errors in fore- 
casting wages and prices, no part of  one period's unemployment could 
depend on the previous period's unemployment. Some of the propositions 
derived from this approach have been met with astonishment-and  with 
delight  or  dismay,  depending  on  attitudes  toward  Keynesian  macro 
theory. The best example of such a proposition is one derived by Sargent 
and Wallace.7 They showed that in  a textbook  Keynesian model,  with 
rational  expectations  imposed,  no  systematic  stabilization  policy  will 
change the variance of fluctuations in real income. 
Practically all the recent work applying rational-expectations models to 
macro theory has been concerned with the Phillips-curve questions raised 
by Friedman, Phelps, Lucas, and others, but the macro implications of 
the efficient-markets  literature have been largely neglected. This neglect is 
unfortunate, not only because the efficient-markets  evidence is so strong 
but also because integration of the two literatures offers significant insights 
into issues of macro theory. 
My purpose in this paper is  to examine the implications of  the two 
branches  of the rational-expectations  literature  for macro theory within the 
context of an abstract, highly aggregated macro model. First, I will argue 
that the well-established  part of the rational-expectations  theory-its  appli- 
cation to the behavior of speculative auction markets-has  not yet been 
satisfactorily incorporated into the general macro model. To  make this 
argument, I will refer especially to estimated econometric models, but pri- 
marily  in order  to give an explicit representation  of ideas that are embodied 
in general, abstract models. 
Second, I will argue that there is some period of analysis short enough 
that the rational-expectations model of aggregate price and wage behavior 
cannot possibly be correct. Expectations are not irrational, but preferences 
and adjustment costs make it desirable to  set some prices and wages in 
advance for a more or less well-specified period of time. I will argue that, 
though  these  contractual (or  contract-like) agreements reflect rational 
expectations concerning the environment in which the contracting parties 
will operate, the existence of  such agreements makes inappropriate the 
"pure" rational-expectations macro models. 
Third, I will emphasize the importance of maintaining consistency in the 
7. Thomas  J. Sargent  and Neil Wallace," 'Rational'  Expectations,  the Optimal  Mone- 
tary Instrument,  and the Optimal Money Supply  Rule," Journial  of Political Econlomy, 
vol. 83 (April 1975), pp. 241-54. William  Poole  467 
assumptions  about the behavior  of a given economic unit in different 
markets.  In particular,  the theory  of consumption  cannot  be independent 
of the  theory  of wages,  and  the  theory  of investment  cannot  be independent 
of theories  of prices  and wages. 
In the following  section,  the efficient-markets  theory  is outlined  and its 
implications  for auction  markets-most financial  markets  and some com- 
modities  markets-are examined.  Next, the aggregate-supply  theory de- 
veloped by Friedman,  Phelps and others is reviewed.  I argue that this 
theory  is inconsistent  with  some of the facts of labor-market  behavior  and 
with  some of the findings  in the efficient-markets  literature. 
An examination  of the contractual  theory of wage and price  behavior 
underpins  an argument  that it provides  a much better  understanding  of 
wage and price behavior  than does the Friedman-Phelps  theory. The 
implications  of the theory  for consumption  and investment  behavior  are 
discussed,  as well as the role of rational  expectations  in determining  con- 
tract  provisions.  The implications  of the analysis  for stabilization  policy 
are  examined.  Finally,  a brief  summary  section  brings  together  the major 
points  of the paper. 
The Efficient-Markets  Theory 
The validity  of the rational-expectations  hypothesis  as applied  to prices 
in active  auction  markets  has been extensively  tested.  Numerous  investi- 
gators  have analyzed  an enormous  amount  of data using many different 
statistical  techniques,  and no serious departure  from the predictions  of 
the hypothesis  has been found. Thus, there is very strong evidence  in 
favor  of the hypothesis.8 
At a high  level of abstraction,  and without  the qualifications  to be dis- 
cussed  below, the accepted  hypothesis  can be described  as follows. Con- 
sider  the price,  P, of the common  stock of MVPT  Corporation,  and for 
simplicity  suppose  that  the dividend  yield  on the stock  is zero  and that risk 
aversion  can be neglected.  Given  these  assumptions,  investors  will bid the 
price  of the stock  at time t to tP*+1/(1  +  r), where tP*+1  is the price  that 
8. The reader  who is uneasy with this statement should first sample the efficient- 
markets  literature  in the Cootner, Fama, and Smith items listed in note 4. The Cootner 
book cites twenty-two  papers, each of which itself refers to many other papers; the 
Fama paper has forty-seven  references;  and the Smith paper, seventy-eight.  (These 
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the market,  at time t, anticipates  will prevail  at time t +  1. The interest 
rate,  r, is the one-period  rate that could be earned  on an alternative  in- 
vestment,  such  as a Treasury  bill. 
To complete  the basic  argument,  note that an objective  observer  could, 
in principle,  estimate  a model incorporating  all the factors  impinging  on 
the price of MVPT common stock, and from this model calculate  the 
expected  value of the price, E(P,+i),  given all information  available  at 
time t. The rational-expectations  hypothesis  is that the market's  psycho- 
logical anticipation,  tP*+1, equals  the true model's expectation,  E(Pt+l). 
Moreover,  the market  uses  the rationally  formed  expectations  efficiently  by 
pushing  prices  on financial  assets  to levels such  that the expected  rates  of 
return  on different  assets  are equal.9 
This simple  statement  of the hypothesis  must be qualified  to allow for 
transactions  and  related  costs,  risk  aversion,  and  inside  information.  Con- 
sider first the pure arbitrage  example  of the market  forces equating  the 
prices  of General  Motors  stock on the New York and  Midwest  exchanges. 
The two prices  cannot  be exactly the same all the time; if they were  the 
returns  to arbitrage  would be zero and no arbitrageurs  would operate. 
But without  arbitrageurs,  there is no mechanism  to insure  that the two 
prices  are even "almost"  the same."' 
The New York and Midwest prices on G.M. stock must differ  by 
enough,  on the average,  to cover  the accounting,  informational,  labor,  and 
other  costs of the arbitrage  business.  The owners  can be expected  to earn 
"the" normal  competitive  rate of return  on their capital  investment.  If 
price differentials  are arbitraged  too much, returns  will be too low and 
resources  will  be withdrawn  from  the arbitrage  industry.  Transactions  costs 
ought  not to affect  the unconditional  (or long-run)  expected  rate  of return; 
however,  period by period, the expected  return  conditional  on current 
information  may be above or below  the unconditional  expected  return  to 
the extent  that transactions  costs make  further  trades  unprofitable. 
By the same  argument,  resources  should  be devoted  to pure  speculation 
up to the point  at which  normal  competitive  returns  are  realized.  Successful 
9. A distinction  is sometimes  made between the rational formation of expectations 
and the efficient  use of those expectations.  This distinction  is not made here because  it 
has little operational  significance;  efficient  use of irrational  expectations  ordinarily  can- 
not be distinguished  in the data from inefficient  use of rational  expectations. 
10. For an abstract  analysis  of this problem,  see Sanford  J. Grossman  and Joseph  E. 
Stiglitz, "Information  and Competitive  Price Systems," American  Economic  Review, 
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speculation on next year's MVPT Corporation stock price may, however, 
require  a greater  degree of skill than pure arbitrage,  and so it would not be 
surprising  if pure speculators earn a higher wage than pure arbitrageurs. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that this conjecture is correct, 
the existence of a large number of millionaire speculators is unlikely. Ex- 
tremely profitable speculation-other  than that due to  chance-appears 
most often to result from innovation in information gathering or knowl- 
edge creation, and casual observation suggests that informational monopo- 
lies break down quickly. 
In the case of a physical commodity, P, and P*+1 must differ by enough 
to cover the costs of storing the commodity over time as well as transactions 
and related costs. After allowing for these factors, economists generally 
attribute long-continuing differences in expected rates of return on assets 
traded  in auction markets  to risk aversion and, indeed, the evidence suggests 
that above-average returns are generally realized on  assets with  above- 
average price volatility. For such reasons, the expected yield on an asset 
with a volatile yield like MVPT stock might well exceed the corresponding 
safe yield on Treasury bills. 
In some cases, high rates of  return-both  expected (by certain indi- 
viduals) and realized-are  clearly related to  "inside" information-par- 
ticular knowledge that an individual has as a result of his special station 
rather than his  special skill.  However,  such information does  not,  for 
present purposes, differ in principle from the information obtained by an 
especially skilled speculator or observer through superior understanding 
and insight. 
If new information typically became available through a gradual diffu- 
sion process, price changes in one direction should be followed  by still 
more in the same direction-a  tendency for persistence or positive serial 
dependence of price change. However, extensive research, including analy- 
sis of daily price data, has built a strong empirical case against the gradual- 
diffusion hypothesis. Near-zero persistence in price changes is found in 
almost all cases. Indeed, statistical studies claiming to  have found sub- 
stantial persistence have so often been overturned by subsequent work- 
usually on the basis of problems in statistical  technique or data collection- 
that great skepticism greets new studies that claim to find it. There seems 
to be relatively little inside information relevant to auction-market prices, 
and public release of whatever exists generates essentially instantaneous 
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Active auction markets are confined almost entirely to financial assets, 
agricultural  commodities, and primary metals. In all of these cases trans- 
actions and storage costs are small relative to the price fluctuations ob- 
served. Differences in  average returns across assets attributable to  risk 
aversion are also relatively small. Consequently, ex  ante knowledge  of 
transactions, storage, and risk costs  allows  prediction of  only  a  small 
fraction of a typical year's changes in auction-market prices. 
The value of an economist's specialized knowledge in predicting auction- 
market prices also appears small relative to the typical magnitude of those 
changes. Since price changes in individual items traded in auction markets 
often amount to 50 or 100 percent per year, or even more, economists and 
the firmns  they advise should accumulate large fortunes if their forecasts are 
any good at all. That they don't suggests that economists are unable to 
forecast with much accuracy the typical year's price changes in auction- 
market goods. 
Economists can earn a normal competitive rate of return in speculation 
for their own accounts and justify their consulting fees if they can predict 
prices just a little better than the market does. But, although predicting 
5 percent of the price variance may easily justify the consulting fees, the in- 
ability to  predict the remaining 95 percent justifies the conclusion that 
price changes in auction markets are largely unpredictable. 
At any given state of knowledge of economic processes, then, the vast 
bulk of price changes in auction markets must be attributed to unpredict- 
able new events, or to the unforeseen implications of prior events. Oddly 
enough, the accumulation of knowledge through research should not be 
expected to improve the economist's rate of return in speculation; rather 
it should reduce price volatility through changes in firms'  policies regarding 
production, inventory management, capital investment, and other matters 
that improve economic efficiency by better anticipating changes in supply 
and demand conditions. 
Confidence in the efficient-markets  theory is strengthened by other con- 
siderations. Auction  markets are well  organized, the  items traded are 
highly standardized, and a large number of individuals and firms trade in 
them. Because there are numerous specialized and well-financed profes- 
sional traders in the market, ample resources are available to counteract 
the effects of irrational traders. Because transactions and storage costs are 
low and price fluctuations large, substantial incentives exist to gather new 
information. Even if most buyers and sellers of a financial asset or a com- William  Poole  471 
modity  traded  in auction  markets  had  strong  preferences  for relatively  slow 
adjustment  of prices,  speculators  are able to force prices  to adjust  to the 
levels  consistent  with  "all  available  information."  In short,  the assumptions 
of the economic theory of competitive,  atomistic markets are closely 
satisfied. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MACRO THEORY 
Although  the prices of some commodities  are determined  in auction 
markets,  the prices  of most of the goods and services  in the gross  national 
product  accounts  are not. As a close first approximation,  therefore,  the 
role of auction  markets  in the pricing  of GNP goods and services  in the 
aggregate  may  be neglected.  In contrast,  however,  the prices  of most finan- 
cial assets  are  either  determined  directly  in auction  markets  or are  closely 
tied  to those  markets.  While  the nonauction  parts  of the financial  market- 
especially  the markets  in the liabilities  of financial  intermediaries-are  of 
great importance,  the auction markets  in stocks and bonds cannot be 
neglected  even as a first  approximation. 
The  macro  implications  of the efficient-markets  theory  will  be illustrated 
by examining  issues  relating  to the term  structure  of interest  rates.  In the 
analysis  it will be assumed  that the efficient-markets  theory  can be taken 
as literally  correct.  The qualifications  to the theory  will be ignored  in the 
same spirit in which distribution  effects and aggregation  problems  are 
ignored. 
The key macro  implication  of the efficient-markets  theory  is that long- 
term  interest  rates  adjust  immediately  and fully in response  to new infor- 
mation. Gradual  adjustment  of long-term  interest  rates implies gradual 
adjustment  of bond prices  and, therefore,  gradual  and predictable  receipt 
of capital  gains  or losses. An unpredicted  event  that changes  equilibrium 
bond prices must, according  to the efficient-markets  evidence,  change 
actual  bond  prices  immediately.  The  same  argument  applies  to stock  prices. 
The business  cycle  is characterized  by persistence,  or serial  dependence, 
in both the level of unemployment  and the change  in GNP prices,  as will 
be detailed  more  carefully  below.  The  efficient-markets  results  imply,  there- 
fore,  that  slow adjustment  in nominal  interest  rates  on securities  traded  in 
auction  markets  cannot  be responsible  for  the  persistence  that  characterizes 
the business  cycle." 
11. This  sentence  must  be interpreted  carefully.  What  is being  ruled  out is slow adjust- 
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To explain the problem with the standard term-structure  equation, it is 
convenient to review the strategy frequently used in testing the efficient- 
markets hypothesis."2  Since the true model  as seen by the hypothetical 
"perfect observer"  is never known, the strategy has been to look for signs 
that P* % E(P). The most common approach has been to search for signs 
of  serial dependence in  the time series of  stock (or other asset) prices, 
P1, P2, P3,  .  .  .  Since such a time series is readily available to all auction- 
market participants,  there ought to be no pattern of price fluctuations that 
would permit any success in forecasting prices. For example, the applica- 
tion of a regression model such as 
log P,+1 =  a +  bo  log P, +  b, log P_1  +  b2 
log  PI-2  +  *  +  bn log Pt-n 
to  a sample of data should, except for normal sampling error, yield an 
estimate of log ( 1 +  r) for a, an estimate of 1.0 for bo, and estimates of 0.0 
for bi, b2, ...  bhn.  If b  1  were not zero but, say, 0.2, a clear profit opportunity 
would exist because at time t the expected change in log P would be a +  0.2 
log Pt-,,  a rate of return above or below r. 
The term-structure  equation typically has the form 
n 
(1)  Rt =  a +  ,  bi 't-i  +  et, 
j=0 
where R is a long-term interest rate, r is a short-term rate, and et is a dis- 
turbance that may or may not be serially correlated. For convenience in the 
analysis below it will be assumed that the disturbance term is not serially 
correlated and in some cases the summation will run from i =  0 to i =  , 
it being understood that bi =  0 for i >  n. 
Equation 1 has been justified by an argument of the following type. Ex- 
cept for a possible liquidity premium, which may be ignored for the pur- 
poses at hand, the long rate ought to equal a suitably weighted average of 
expected short rates over the life of the long-term bond. Enough investors 
are assumed indifferent to  the maturity of the bond  they hold that the 
return on, say, a ten-year bond held to maturity will equal the expected 
return from holding ten successive one-year bonds. Or, equivalently, the 
12. For other discussions  of some of the same issues examined  in the analysis im- 
mediately  below, see Charles  R. Nelson, "Rational  Expectations  and the Estimation  of 
Econometric  Models," International  Economic  Review,  vol. 16 (October  1975),  pp. 555- 
61; John Rutledge,  A Monetarist  Model of Inflationary  Expectations  (Lexington  Books, 
1974). William  Poole  473 
expected return  from holding a ten-year bond for one year ought to equal 
the known return  from holding a one-year bond to maturity. After the pas- 
sage of a year, the observed one-year bond rate will in general differ from 
the one-year rate that, one year earlier, had been expected to prevail. This 
forecasting error will lead investors to modify-in  a manner that depends 
on the particular model-their  expectations of one-year bond rates. The 
rate on long-term bonds will then adjust to reflect these revised expecta- 
tions. Because realized one-year rates provide the information leading to 
revisions in expected one-year rates, the long-term bond rate is a function 
of current and past one-year rates, as in equation 1. 
The basic problems with this theory can be illustrated with a two-period 
discount bond for the "long" rate, and a one-period discount bond for the 
"short"  rate. The return  from holding a two-period bond to maturity ought 
to equal the expected return  from holding two successive one-period bonds, 
as in equation 2: 
(2)  (1 +  Rt)2 =  [1 +  rt] [1 +  E (rt+1)], 
where E (rt+i)  denotes the expected short rate. Multiplying out the terms in 
equation 2 yields 
1 +  2R, +  RI-  1 +  rt +  E (rt+1) +  rt E (rt+?), 
t  t 
or 
(3)  Rt  _  1/2  [rt +  E (rt+?)]. 
The equation 3 approximation-which  is quite accurate because an interest 
rate, being a small decimal fraction, becomes insignificant when squared- 
will be used for convenience below, but exact expressions could be used. 
Outlined loosely above was the argument  that revisions in expected one- 
year rates might depend on the error in forecasting the present short-term 
rate. If these revisions are to be rational, some model by which short rates 
are generated  must be assumed. Because the term-structure  equation ordi- 
narily includes no variables other than interest rates, the appropriate  model 
is one in which the behavior over time of the short rate is given by a stable 
stochastic process such as 
(4)  rt+  =E  ci rt_- +  vt+?. 
i=O 
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placed  on the ci, such  as assuming  ci =  0 for i >  m; but for present  pur- 
poses  the  infinite  sum  in equation  4 may  be retained.  It will  also  be assumed 
that the disturbances,  v, have mean zero and are serially  independent.'3 
Since  the  major  issue  explored  below  involves  first  differences,  the constant 
term  in equation  4 is not shown  explicitly. 
With  rational  expectations, 
E  (rt+,)  =  ci rt-i. 
t  i=O 
Substituting  this expression  into equation  3 yields 
(5)  Rt =  1/2 (rt +  E  ci r-i)  =  1/2 (1 +  co)  r, +  1/2  c2  cr  i. 
Equation  5 is identical  in form  to equation  1-the  standard  term-structure 
equation-except that it has no disturbance  term. 
In this  model  new information  affects  both the short  and  the long rates. 
The  effect  on the short  rate  in period  I is vt and  the expected  effect  on short 
rates  may  be found  by solving  equation  4 recursively  for t +  1, t +  2, .... 
with v  t+,  v  t+2,  . . . set equal to zero. Once the expected short rates are 
calculated-E(rt?,) is the only expectation  needed in the current  ex- 
ample-the effect  of vt  on the  long  rate  may  be calculated  through  the  term- 
structure  equation-equation 5 in this example.  The model assumes  that 
equation  4 is the only information  investors  have about  the future  course 
of interest  rates. 
In general,  however,  investors  know much  more  than that about  future 
interest  rates.  For example,  the short rate may rise either  because  of an 
increase  in government  expenditures  financed  by new bond issues  and ac- 
companied  by partial  monetary  accommodation  or because  of monetary 
restriction.  Long rates  might,  therefore,  rise  in the first  case and fall, or at 
least rise  less, in the second. 
An estimated  term-structure  equation  should  have  coefficients  reflecting 
the relative  frequency  of the various  types  of disturbances  in the particular 
sample  period, and these coefficients  should  be consistent  with those for 
13. The Modigliani-Shiller  model, to be discussed  below, has a term-structure  equa- 
tion similar  to equation  1 but with a distributed  lag on the inflation  rate added  to reflect 
the effects of inflation  on expected  short rates. This addition is irrelevant  to my point 
because it simply requires  another time-series  model (similar to equation 4) for the 
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the short  rate in equation  4. Modigliani  and Shiller,  who first  made this 
argument  precise,  provided  evidence  supporting  this view.'4 
The Modigliani-Shiller  findings,  however,  do not justify  using  the ordi- 
nary  term-structure  equation  in a macro  model.  To argue  that  the  behavior 
of the  long and  short  rates  in a particular  sample  period  is consistent  is not 
the same as saying  that the long rate is determined  by a market  process 
yielding  a term-structure  equation  with  constant  coefficients.  If equation  4 
is not immutable,  the term-structure  equation cannot be considered  a 
structural  equation  since its parameters  cannot be independent  of other 
equations,  including  those describing  government  policy,  in the economy. 
Indeed,  the fact that the Federal  Reserve  gets a great  deal of policy  advice 
based  on the expectation  that  it can, and on the hope that it will, alter  the 
behavior  of the short  rate  over  time suggests  that many  believe  that equa- 
tion 4 is not immutable. 
The argument  is the same  as that for the random-walk  model of stock 
prices.  Changes  in stock  prices  are not "uncaused,"  as some interpret  the 
meaning  of "random,"  but serially  uncorrelated  because  investors  react 
rationally  when responding  to unpredictable  causal  events.  The rational- 
expectations  theory  restricts  the behavior  of stock  prices  over  time;  it also 
restricts  the relationship  in a particular  sample  period between  the co- 
efficients  in a time-series  model of the short  rate and the coefficients  in a 
term-structure  model of the long rate. 
The  interpretation  of the  term-structure  equation  as a structural  relation- 
ship  is inconsistent  with  the  efficient-markets  theory.  Suppose  the  long-term 
rate  in the term-structure  equation  1 is the Aaa bond yield. Advancing  the 
time  subscript  by one and taking  the first  difference  of equation  1 yields 
(6)  Rt+ -Rt  =  bo  (rt+l  -  rt) +  bi  (rt_i  -  rt)  +  et+,  -  et. 
This equation  implies  that as of time t  the expected  change  in the bond 
yield  is a function  of the expected  change  and  of the known  past  changes  in 
the short  rate.  For at least some historical  patterns  in short  rates,  and for 
some  patterns  proposed  to central  bankers,  the expected  changes  in yield 
imply  expected  capital  gains  or losses  that  would  produce  an expected  one- 
14. Franco  Modigliani  and Robert J. Shiller,  "Inflation,  Rational Expectations,  and 
the Term Structure  of Interest Rates," Economica,  vol. 40 n.s. (February 1973), pp. 
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period yield substantially different from the known yield on a one-period 
bond. The term structure model is,  therefore, strictly inconsistent with 
rational expectations unless all the bi for i >  1 are zero. Only the new in- 
formation reflected  in rt+i ought to matter since all the old information is 
already incorporated in R,  1 The  same  argument applies to  the  term- 
structure  error term, et, in equation 1. At time t, et can be calculated from 
equation 1. From equation 6 the expected change in the long rate depends 
on et unless E(e,+,)  =  e,.  In this case the term-structure error term fol- 
lows a random walk, a specification with obvious problems that need not 
be discussed here. 
Phillips and Pippenger  estimated equation 6, rewritten with R t moved to 
the right-hand side, and found insignificant coefficients for all of the rt-i 
for i >  1.16  The history of the short rate provided no information useful in 
predicting R,+1 that was not already incorporated in Rt.  This finding is in 
keeping with the efficient-markets  theory and with the findings on the stock 
market of numerous investigators. 
The above analysis is of the same kind that Lucas first made precise.'7 
Lucas argued that the equations for consumption and investment typically 
used in econometric models were, in a sense, inconsistent with accepted 
theories. For example, in consumption theory the short-run marginal pro- 
pensity to consume depends on the relative variances of permanent and 
transitory income. A  new government policy, perhaps based on simula- 
tions of econometric models, would alter the relative variances and thereby 
change the parameters of the consumption function upon which the simu- 
lations were based. 
While this argument is surely correct, its quantitative importance for the 
aggregate  consumption function might be questioned on the ground that- 
15. This argument  does not quite hold for the Aaa bond index since the passage  of 
a year will bring  the individual  bonds in the index one year  closer to maturity.  As long- 
term bonds become short-term  bonds they are replaced  in the sample from which the 
index is calculated.  Since the investor  buys bonds and not the index, there can be ex- 
pected changes in the Aaa yield index without any expected capital gains or losses. 
However,  this consideration  is of minor importance  since the issues in the index have 
long terms  to maturity  and the composition  of the index changes  only slowly. 
16. Llad Phillips and John Pippenger,  "Preferred  Habitat vs. Efficient  Market: A 
Test of Alternative  Hypotheses,"  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, vol. 58 
(May 1976),  pp. 11-19. 
17. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric  Policy Evaluation: A  Critique,"  in Karl 
Brunner  and Allan H. Meltzer,  eds., The  Phillips  Curve  and  Labor  Markets  (Amsterdam 
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apart  from  the extremes  of great  depressions  and great  inflations-most of 
the variance  of household  income  is determined  by micro factors. A 10 
percent  change  in real GNP relative  to potential  in one year is a "sharp 
slump"  or a "runaway  boom."  Yet, changes  in the  income  of an  individual 
household  of 10 percent  or more when  GNP is at its potential  are by no 
means  uncommon.  A worker's  promotion  or demotion,  or five weeks of 
unemployment,  can easily  entail  such a change. 
The Lucas  argument,  it seems  to me, has much  greater  force when ap- 
plied to the determination  of interest  rates. Consider  what might hap- 
pen  if the Federal  Reserve  announced  (credibly)  that  money  growth  would 
remain  constant  for the next  ten years.  Monetarists  and  Keynesians  would 
argue  about  the outcome,  but no one would  be surprised  if securities  prices 
changed  dramatically  immediately  after  the announcement.  Ignoring  the 
effects  of public perceptions  of government  policy on consumption  be- 
havior  may  be no worse  than  ignoring  distribution  effects  on consumption; 
but  ignoring  the  effects  on interest  rates  is a far  more  serious  matter.  Ample 
experience  shows that identifiable  events cause immediate  and dramatic 
changes  in the prices  of securities  of particular  issuers,  and the efficient- 
markets  literature  provides  strong  evidence  for the proposition  that these 
revaluations  correctly  assess  the import  of new information. 
If this argument  is accepted,  a severe  problem  is raised  for econometric 
models.  Many  models  have  a structure  in which  (a) one or more  short-term 
interest  rates  appear  in a money-market  sector,  which  includes  a demand- 
for-money  equation  and one or more  equations  determining  the supply  of 
money  through  the banking  system;  (b) short-term  interest  rates  determine 
one or more  long-term  rates  through  term-structure  equations;  and  (c) the 
long-term  interest  rates appear  in investment  equations  that determine  a 
significant  portion of aggregate  demand.  In addition,  long-term  interest 
rates  may  be related  to dividend  yields,  which  in turn  affect  the level of the 
stock market,  household  wealth,  and consumption.  Model dynamics  de- 
pend  importantly  on the lagged  adjustment  of long rates  to short  rates  in 
the term-structure  equation. According to  the argument  above, these 
dynamics  cannot  be trusted. 
In principle,  the proper  approach  to linking  short-term  and long-term 
interest  rates might be as follows. First, simulate the model with the 
standard  term-structure  equation.  Next, abandon  the standard  equation 
and recalculate  the long-term  rate period  by period,  using the simulated 
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expectations under the assumption that the future short rates are properly 
anticipated. Simulate the model again, treating the calculated long rates as 
exogenous. In this simulation a new path of short rates will appear, and 
the long rates can then be recalculated  for the next iteration. 
If this iterative  procedure converged, the result would be identical to that 
derived analytically by Muth in his very simple theoretical model of an 
agricultural market. Expectations of  short rates, as incorporated in the 
current  long rate, would be rational because the total model solution given 
those  expectations would  generate simulated short  rates equal  to  the 
expected short rates.18 
This  proposal may  not  be  computationaliy feasible  in  any  but  the 
smallest models, but it helps to  indicate the dimension of  the problem 
raised  for econometric modeling. More generally,  this line of argument  sug- 
gests that the role of financial markets in the business cycle does not arise 
from faulty pricing of securities, where "faulty" is interpreted  in the ex ante 
sense. Interest rates and the decisions based on them will, of course, fre- 
quently prove to have been faulty ex post in the light of new information. 
Rather than emphasize the "animal spirits" of businessmen and specu- 
lators, it seems more appropriate  to look for the events that generate busi- 
ness fluctuations in spite of properly laid plans. This notion underlies the 
Friedman-Phelps aggregate supply function, but before getting into that 
subject a brief comment on forecasting seems in order. 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR FORECASTING 
As emphasized above, the efficient-markets  evidence supports the propo- 
sition that current securities prices are efficient predictors of future securi- 
ties prices. The predictions are not necessarily very accurate, but they are 
efficient  in the sense of incorporating all available information and in being 
hard to beat. 
In many cases auction markets provide direct data on market anticipa- 
tions. Futures markets exist in a number of commodities and foreign cur- 
rencies, and in January 1976 a futures market in three-month Treasury  bills 
was opened. Even if these prices were determined inefficiently.  they should 
18. In the context of simulations  designed  to explore  the effects of alternative  policy 
assumptions,  the iterative  procedure  is equivalent  to assuming  that the market  learns  of 
policy changes  as soon as the policymakers  do. While this assumption  may seem a bit 
extreme,  it has a better  theoretical  justification  than any particular  assumption  involving 
lagged reactions.  Indeed, the market, by correctly anticipating  events that will force 
policymakers  to act, probably  learns  of some policy  changes  before  the policymakers  do. William  Poole  479 
be used  for some  purposes.  In equations  requiring  expectational  variables, 
surely  futures-market  prices  should  be employed  rather  than  either  survey 
data  on, say,  interest-rate  anticipations  or hypothesized  time-series  models 
in which anticipated  values are modeled as distributed-lag  functions of 
realized  values. 
A particularly  interesting  problem  is raised  by the new futures  market 
in Treasury  bills.  While,  previously,  interest-rate  anticipations  could  be in- 
ferred  from the yields on securities  of different  maturities,  the futures 
market  in bills probably  generates  more accurate  data because  the trans- 
actions  costs of dealing  in futures  are  so much  lower  than  those of dealing 
in securities.'9 
Suppose  a six-quarter  simulation  of a forecasting  model  generates  simu- 
lated bill rates  that differ  from those observed  in the futures  market.  If 
the forecaster  accepts  the efficient-markets  hypothesis,  the simulation  will 
have  to be redone  so that  it generates  bill rates  equal  to the observed  rates 
in the  futures  market.  The  forecaster  will  have  to decide  whether  to change 
his money-demand  function,  his assumptions  about  central-bank  behavior, 
or the simulated  level  of income  (and  hence  other  equations  in the model). 
At a minimum,  forecasters  ought  to see  what  model  adjustments  are  needed 
to simulate  the bill-rate  path observed  in the futures  market.  Anyone  with 
great  confidence  in the efficient-markets  model will, I believe,  want the 
forecaster  to make  his simulation  match  the futures-market  path exactly. 
This argument  does not imply that model forecasting  is useless,  because 
there  are many variables,  especially  quantities,  for which no observable 
market  forecasts  exist. 
To summarize  this section,  the efficient-markets  literature  substantially 
documents  the proposition  that auction  markets  function  efficiently.  The 
predictions  of the theory  are not satisfied  exactly-nor should  that be ex- 
pected-but the theory  comes  close enough  to reality  that  for most macro 
problems  nothing  is gained  by attempting  to "beat  the  market."  In building 
macro  models, one should not assume  that financial  markets  are char- 
acterized  by lagged adjustments;  and those making  forecasts  of interest 
rates  and  commodity  prices  would  be well  advised  to consult  data  on prices 
in futures  markets  before  speaking. 
19. The standard  contract  in the futures  market  is for $1 million of bills. The round- 
trip transactions  cost is about $60 per contract.  Brokers  are required  to put up $1,500 
per contract  on margin  account, and individuals  dealing  through  brokers  must put up 
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Friedman-Phelps  Aggregate  Supply  Theory 
The  central  issues  raised  for macroeconomic  theory  by recent  work  em- 
ploying  the rational-expectations  hypothesis  concern  the relationships  be- 
tween  prices  and wages  on the one hand and output  and employment  on 
the other.  The argument  put forth by Friedman,  Phelps,  Lucas, Sargent 
and  Wallace,  and  a growing  number  of other  economists  is that  fluctuations 
in output  and employment  are caused  by errors  of firms  and workers  in 
predicting  prices  and  wages  in an environment  in which  the predictions  are 
rational.  In the  theory  no distinction  need  be made  between  wage  and  price 
behavior  because  the theory  does not attempt  to explain  the business  cycle 
by cyclical  differences  in wage and price  adjustments.  For convenience  of 
exposition,  the theory  will  be referred  to as  the "Friedman-Phelps  aggregate 
supply  theory,"  since  these  investigators  apparently  were  the first  to state 
the hypothesis  clearly. 
The Friedman-Phelps  theory relies, in some respects,  on a rational- 
expectations  argument  very different  from that discussed  in the previous 
section.  The financial-market  theory  has emphasized  the determination  of 
the prices of financial assets rather than of the quantities "produced." In 
that theory,  the market  drives  today's price to equality  (ignoring  trans- 
actions  and storage  costs and the like) with the price  expected  to prevail 
tomorrow,  given  expectations  rationally  formed  on all of today's  informa- 
tion. In the context  of a securities  trader's  decision  to hold an inventory  of 
common  stocks,  the quantities  purchased  (or sold short)  today depend  on 
the expected  relationship  between  today's  and tomorrow's  prices. 
The flavor of the Friedman-Phelps  theory, on the other hand, is that 
today's quantities  of goods produced  (or labor services  sold) depend  on 
the relationship  of today's  price  to yesterday's  expectation  of that price. 
Output  and employment  change  today because  information  about today 
that is in principle  "available"  is not in fact gathered  and processed,  and 
so mistakes  are  made.  The producer  (worker)  is assumed  to use rationally 
the information  contained  in today's  price  (wage)  in his market,  but he is 
also assumed  to have incomplete  information  about the relationship  be- 
tween that price and the general  price level. The individual  producer 
(worker)  interprets  part  of an increase  in his price  (wage)  as an increase  in 
his relative  price (wage)  justifying  an increase  in the amount of goods 
(hours)  offered  for sale. Thus,  employment  and output  rise  even when  the William  Poole  481 
wage and price increases are general and the perceived changes in money 
wages and prices do  not  in  fact  reflect changes in  relative wages  and 
prices.20 
The Friedman-Phelps theory must invoke lags of some type to explain 
the persistence of unemployment since in the theory output deviates from 
4"potential"  or "normal" output only as a result of a discrepancy between 
realized and previously expected prices. The theory is consistent with a 
business cycle caused by a run of forecasting errors (similar to a run of 
"heads" in a coin-tossing game) but not  with a cycle exhibiting serially 
correlated unemployment. Since forecast errors cannot be serially corre- 
lated under rational expectations, the theory must, therefore, appeal to 
some  other mechanism to  explain  the  observed persistence (serial de- 
pendence) of unemployment. 
The Friedman-Phelps theory has to  find a way to explain persistence 
because persistence is so great. In a model estimated by Lucas, the cycli- 
cal component of annual output in the United States depends on the lagged 
cyclical component with a coefficient of 0.887.21  Sargent, in a recent paper 
employing a similar aggregate  supply function, reported  coefficients  on four 
lagged values of unemployment in a quarterly  U.S. model. His coefficients 
were 1.47,-  0.59,-  0.03, and 0.04, and also show considerable  persistence.22 
In the Friedman-Phelps theory persistence might  arise from  techno- 
logically determined lags in the aggregate supply function. An example of 
such a lag would be physical limitations on the speed with which a blast 
furnace can be brought into production because it must be heated slowly 
to avoid cracking its brick lining. But a technological explanation is un- 
satisfactory given the occasionally rapid changes in output. 
Many economists have argued that the Friedman-Phelps Phillips-curve 
20. The emphasis  in this paragraph  on the comparison  of today's price with yester- 
day's expectation  is exaggerated  in that some expositions  of the theory  rely on a some- 
what different  mechanism.  See Robert J. Barro  and Stanley  Fischer,  "Recent  Develop- 
ments in Monetary  Theory,"  Journal  of Monetary  Economics,  vol. 2 (April 1976), pp. 
133-67, especially  pp. 155-61. 
21. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Some International  Evidence  on Output-Inflation  Trade- 
offs," American  Economic  Review,  vol. 63 (June 1973),  pp. 326-34. 
22. Thomas  J. Sargent,  "A Classical  Macroeconomic  Model for the United States," 
Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 84 (April 1976),  pp. 207-37. Robert King has pointed 
out to me that the lagged unemployment  coefficients  estimated  by Sargent  are almost 
identical  to those estimated  in an ARIMA model by Charles  R. Nelson, "The  Prediction 
Performance  of the FRB-MIT-Penn  Model of the U.S. Economy,"  Americanl  Economic 
Review,  vol. 62 (December  1972),  pp. 902-17. The price-forecasting  error  term  in Lucas- 
type equations  explaining  unemployment  contributes  very little to the R2. 482  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1976 
theory is inconsistent with observed behavior in the labor market. In addi- 
tion, Hall has argued  that information lags cannot possibly be long enough 
to rescue the theory.23  This argument can be strengthened by referring to 
the efficient-markets  evidence. If firm A changes its selling price the evi- 
dence suggests that this action, through its effects on the profits of firm A 
and its competitors, is reflected  immediately in the prices of securities  issued 
by the firms involved. It is unreasonable to believe both that the securities 
markets correctly evaluate the new information and that the new informa- 
tion spreads only gradually to the firms' managers. Moreover, the magni- 
tude of the lost wages and lost profits in a recession seems to justify large 
expenditures by workers and firms on information gathering in the effort 
to  minimize mistakes made  in  sorting  out  relative from  general price 
changes. My impression is that information gathering-job  search, for ex- 
ample-is  not nearly as extensive as the Friedman-Phelps theory seems to 
require. 
Empirical work based on this theory has dealt with unemployment per- 
sistence by adding lagged unemployment rates to  the basic model. The 
questionable nature of this procedure  is perhaps most apparent  in the Lucas 
paper, "Some International Evidence." In that paper, the aggregate supply 
function is 
yet  =  a  (Pt  -  Pt)  +  Xyet-i, 
where yc is the cyclical component of income, and P and P are the actual 
and expected price levels. The parameter a  depends on the relationship 
between the variance in relative and absolute prices; as the variance in the 
absolute price level increases, a declines. 
Lucas closed the model by inserting additional equations, and then fit it 
separately to  time-series data for eighteen countries. He  found that the 
estimate of a  strictly speaking, of a parameter functionally related to a, 
denoted 7r-was  dramatically lower for the two countries in the sample 
with dranmatically  higher price-level variance. 
But the estimated X  turns out to be negatively correlated with a country's 
mean rate of price change as well as with the variance of its price changes.24 
23. On the first point, see Robert J. Gordon, "Recent Developments  in the Theory 
of Inflation  and Unemployment,"  Journal  of Monetary  Economics,  vol. 2 (April 1976), 
pp. 185-219. On the second, see Robert E. Hall, "The Rigidity of Wages and the Per- 
sistence  of Unemployment,"  BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 301-35; see especially  Sims' comment, 
p. 337, and Hall's reply,  pp. 344-45. 
24. Lucas, "Some International  Evidence,"  tables 1 and 2. William  Poole  483 
The  two correlation  coefficients  are -0.45  and -0.24,  respectively.  More- 
over,  the Lucas  ir is as highly  correlated  with  the  mean price  change  as with 
the variance; the two correlation  coefficients  are -0.69  and -0.67,  re- 
spectively.  Finally,  the correlation  coefficient  between  wr  and  X is 0.35.25 
As Lucas  has made  particularly  clear  in a recent  paper,  a theory  of the 
persistent  business  cycle  cannot  rely  on the assumption  of rational  expecta- 
tions applied  to complete  information,  where  "complete"  is interpreted  as 
the information  available  to an omniscient  outside  observer.26  In this  paper 
Lucas  builds  a theoretical  cycle  model on the assumptions  that economic 
units  have  incomplete  knowledge  of the current  state of the economy  and 
that  there  are  lags in acquiring  information  on past states  of the economy. 
Period  by period,  the available,  but imperfect,  information  is optimally 
used in determining  prices and quantities  in auction, or auction-like, 
markets.  The information  lags generate  the persistent  cycle. 
The  introduction  of information  lags  into a model  obviously  can  produce 
serial  dependence,  and yet the device  seems  no more satisfactory  than the 
direct  assumption  of adaptive  expectations.27  To exaggerate  a bit, in the 
efficient-markets  literature,  prices  at time t are determined  on the basis of 
all available  information-every  scrap  of data  that could  in principle  have 
been  gathered  at time t-and  prices  change  over  time  in response  to events 
that are, in principle,  unpredictable  at time t. The distinction  between 
knowledge  of the past and present  on the one hand  and knowledge  of the 
future  on the other,  while  not as straightforward  as it may appear  on the 
surface,  seems  nevertheless  to be a much more solid basis for building  a 
theory of the cycle than is the distinction  relied upon by Lucas-that 
between  known  and unknown  current  data. 
Lucas  has made  especially  clear  the need  to specify  informationally  dis- 
25. In fact,  these  results  are  consistent  with  theories  asserting  that anticipated  inflation 
has real  effects.  The estimates  imply  that the benefits  of inflationary  policies  are  two-fold: 
the slope of the Phillips  curve is steeper  and the persistence  of unemployment,  when it 
occurs, is less. Nevertheless,  these implications  ought not to be accepted because the 
Friedman-Phelps  theory  is built on the assumption  that prices  and wages  are  reset  period 
by period  as if in auction markets.  This point is discussed  more extensively  below. 
26. "An Equilibrium  Model of the Business Cycle," Journal  of Political Economy, 
vol. 83 (December  1975),  pp. 1113-44. 
27. Indeed, in "Rational Expectations,"  Muth showed how adaptive expectations 
could be rational  under  certain  assumptions  as to the stochastic  structure  of the market 
if the adaptive  parameter  reflected  that structure.  However,  it remains  true  that adaptive 
expectations  are not rational  if other information  besides  the past behavior  of a variable 
can improve  predictions. 484  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1976 
tinct  markets  in the  macro  model.28  His approach  has  emphasized  spatially 
separate  auction-like  markets  as the source of information  failures.  The 
alternative  is to emphasize  the temporal separation  of nonauction  markets. 
A nonauction  market  is not necessarily  a noncompetitive  market.  Agents 
in nonauction  markets  do not necessarily  earn  returns  above those avail- 
able  in auction  markets  nor  do they  necessarily  have  any  substantial  discre- 
tion over  their  price  and output  policies.  Given  the problems  with  a theory 
based  on informationally  separate  auction  markets,  it seems  more  promis- 
ing  to rely  on nonauction  markets  with  agents  who are  severely  constrained 
by competitive  forces to follow the nonauction  policies of setting  wages 
and prices  in advance  and accepting  the quantity  adjustments  determined 
by market  demands.  The reasons  for this behavior  are the subject  of the 
burgeoning  literature  on contractual  theories  of wage and price determi- 
nation,  to which  I now turn. 
Contractual  Wage  and  Price  Theories 
Underlying  the contractual  theories  is the observation  that most labor 
services  cannot  be sold in auction  markets.  In an auction  market  a seller 
has no particular  reason to maintain  a relationship  with any particular 
buyer;  goods  can  be sold period  by period  to whoever  offers  the best  price. 
And even when  buyer-seller  relationships  develop,  an auction  market  be- 
haves  as if they were  unimportant.  Labor  markets,  however,  cannot  work 
this way. There  is no arbitrage  mechanism  to force rapid  adjustment  be- 
cause  adjustment  costs  prohibit  minute-by-minute  changes  in the employer 
to whom  labor services  are sold. Like a household's  decision  on the pur- 
chase of consumer  durables,  a decision  of a firm to make a job offer,  or 
of an  individual  to accept  it, necessarily  involves  a calculation  over  a period 
stretching  into the future.  Calculations  of this type are  emphasized  in the 
job-search  literature. 
All of this seems  straightforward  enough,  and  the implication  is that  for 
any particular  economy  (specified  by a given  set of stochastic  properties) 
there  must  be some time period-a  quarter,  a month, or whatever-short 
28. "The introduction  of separate,  informationally  distinct  markets  is ...  an analyti- 
cal departure  which appears essential  (in some form) to an explanation  of the way in 
which business cycles can arise and persist in a competitive  economy." (Lucas, "An 
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enough that the Friedman-Phelps  theory cannot possibly be correct.29  But 
the question remains as to why an employee's attachment to a firm takes 
the form of  an arrangement with a relatively predetermined wage and 
variable hours. 
Recent work on contractual theories provides a much more solid expla- 
nation of stable wages than older notions depending on rigidities and in- 
stitutional  factors.30  Wage adjustment  may be slow because it is rational for 
it to be slow, and the institutions are shaped by economic forces. 
The contractual theories are built on two basic ideas: differences  in risk 
aversion between employers and employees and information costs. 
Suppose the wage clause in a contract with fixed hours and variable 
wages consists of a formula by which the firm's value added is divided 
quarter by quarter between employees and owners.3"  All wages consist of 
profit sharing. Sharecropping  provides an example of this arrangement. 
Azariadis, Baily, Gordon, and others argue that the variable-wage con- 
tract increases the variance of the employee's income compared with the 
contract that has a fixed wage and variable hours. Being risk averse com- 
pared with the firm, employees prefer the fixed-wage contract and  "pay" 
the firm in the form of lower expected real wages. 
Informational considerations, however, may be more  important than 
risk considerations. In the profit-sharing  method of defining  variable  wages, 
for example, a firm's owners have an incentive to understate profits-as 
they already do because the corporate income tax makes the government 
a profit sharer. Since a strike might be the only method by which workers 
could enforce their views of appropriate accounting rules, it is not difficult 
29. The argument  is much the same as Friedman's permanent-income  theory of 
consumption:  daily  consumption  cannot be a function of daily income receipts. 
30. Costas  Azariadis,  "Implicit  Contracts  and Underemployment  Equilibria,"  Journal 
of Political  Economy,  vol. 83 (December  1975),  pp. 1183-1202;  Martin  N. Baily,  "Wages 
and Employment  under  Uncertain  Demand,"  Review  of Economic  Studies,  vol. 41 (Janu- 
ary 1974),  pp. 37-50; Donald F. Gordon, "A Neo-Classical  Theory of Keynesian  Un- 
employment,"  Economic  Inquiry,  vol. 12  (December  1974),  pp. 431-59; Arthur  M. Okun, 
"Inflation:  Its Mechanics  and Welfare  Costs,"  BPEA, 2:1975,  pp. 351-90. For references 
to additional  papers in this rapidly growing line of literature,  see Gordon, "Recent 
Developments,"  pp. 216-19. 
31. With  variable  wages, hours are not necessarily  "fixed"  but can be chosen by the 
employee.  When  real wages decline the contract might provide  that hours decline, re- 
flecting  the value of leisure.  However,  the evidence  suggests  that the average  workweek 
is not much  affected  by interindustry  differences  and secular  changes  in real wages. For 
simplicity,  therefore,  it seems reasonable  to discuss  the fixed hours-variable  wage con- 
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to see how a variable  wage-fixed  hours  contract  might  evolve  into a fixed 
wage-variable  hours  contract. 
R. J. Gordon  criticizes  the insurance  argument  on the ground  that its 
logic calls  for a further  step: contracts  should  provide  for fixed  wages  and 
fixed  hours.  A tenure  contract,  however,  has  an obvious  problem.32  Suppose 
that within a fixed total aggregate  demand,  demand  shifts from firm  A 
to firm  B. With a tenure  contract  there  is no reason  for labor resources 
already  in place to be reallocated,  although  new entrants  into the labor 
force  will  be hired  by firm  B. Ignoring  new entrants  for simplicity,  the two 
firms  will  maintain  output  roughly  unchanged;  the price  of firm  A's goods 
will  fall  and  the  price  of firm  B's goods  will  rise  in order  to clear  the  market. 
In order  to honor  its tenure  contract,  firm  A will have  to operate  at a loss, 
but it will operate  its fixed  capital  and fixed  labor  stock to produce  goods 
as long as prices  cover materials  costs. The loss is offset during  periods 
when  the demand  for its goods is high. 
To avoid  bankruptcy  questions  for the moment,  suppose  demand  shifts 
are  always  temporary-that  is, demand  goes  from  General  Motors  to Ford 
and  back again.  If the potentially  variable  factor,  labor,  is not reallocated 
as demand  shifts,  then  the productive  process  will be less efficient.  In con- 
trast,  the fixed-wage  contract  will reallocate  labor as workers  are laid off 
by some firms  and then hired  by others.  Indeed,  the reallocation  of labor 
through  layoffs  and new  hires  as micro  disturbances  occur  may generate  a 
pattern  of wages  and  employment  across  industries  not much  different  from 
what  would  come about  in the classical  auction-market  model  with a high 
degree  of labor  mobility.  In that  model  small  changes  in relative  wages  are 
sufficient  to induce  workers  to move to new  jobs; and so the end result  of 
the adjustment  to a micro disturbance  is a reallocation  of labor without 
lasting  wage  differentials. 
32. Indeed it has several problems.  Probably  more important  than the factors ana- 
lyzed below is that a firm may have difficulty  in getting a worker  to perform  under a 
tenure  contract.  If a worker  is not paid when he does not appear  at the job, his contract 
is one providing  for fixed wages and variable  hours at the worker's  option rather  than, 
as discussed  above, either  tenure  or fixed  wages and variable  hours at the firm's  option. 
An unreliable  tenured  worker  loses no current  wages by "going fishing"  but does lose 
future  wages  by developing  a "bad  reputation."  In contrast  to auction  markets,  reliability 
is important  in the labor  market  and many  product  markets  because  of the costs imposed 
on others.  The absence  of a "key"  man may shut down a production  process  and leave 
other  workers  with nothing  to do. For a further  discussion  of these issues, see Herschel 
I. Grossman,  "Risk Shifting and Reliability  in Labor Markets,"  Scandinavian  Journal 
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T he key point about the tenure contract, then, is that it does not contain 
a mechanism to reallocate labor. While full employment will be sustained 
by the tenure contract in the face of a macro disturbance, the allocative 
inefficiencies  in the face of micro disturbances will require that all firms, 
when negotiating contracts, offer wages lower than those that could be 
offered under fixed-wage  contracts. 
The size of this wage differential  will depend on the effects of the fixed- 
wage contract in generating unemployment. The employee negotiating a 
fixed-wage  contract  must make an allowance for the expected costs of being 
unemployed (expected hours unemployed times the difference  between the 
after-tax wage and the value of leisure time plus unemployment benefits, 
and so forth); and these costs must be compared to those associated with 
the allocative inefficiencies  of tenure contracts. 
Since the U.S. economy is characterized  by substantial and continuous 
micro reallocation, expected incomes may well be enough higher under 
fixed-wage contracts than under tenure contracts to  persuade most em- 
ployees to forgo the security of tenure. This argument seems convincing 
because changes in tastes and technology are so often permanent and uni- 
directional  rather  than temporary and reversible;  the failure of tenure con- 
tracts to reallocate labor would generate  large costs compared with cyclical 
unemployment. Moreover, the  possibility  that  tenure contracts  would 
bankrupt the firms that offer them means that some of the contracts may 
not be honored anyway. 
Tenure need not be permanent, of course, but the distinction between 
two-year tenure contracts and fixed-wage contracts is  not  great. Many 
workers already have quasi-tenure through formal or informal seniority 
practices, and for many there may not be much difference  ex ante between 
the expected cost of layoffs with two weeks' notice and the expected cost 
of nonrenewal of tenure at specified contract termination dates. 
This discussion suggests that fixed-wage contracts are generally optimal, 
but leaves open the question as to why contracts are not constructed so as 
to provide enough wage flexibility to avoid prolonged cyclical unemploy- 
ment. Consider the same question applied to predictable seasonal unem- 
ployment. No  disequilibrium of any kind need be implied when a resort 
hotel pays its labor a constant wage rate, independent of season, and offers 
seasonally fluctuating  employment. All that is required  is that the wage rate 
be high enough, given the seasonal pattern of hours, to compensate hotel 
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labor. The compensation will, of course, reflect the tastes of workers for 
leisure time in the  off season  and their opportunities elsewhere in  the 
economy (including those for off-season work). Depending on the pricing 
policy of the hotel, the wage rate week by week may or may not equal the 
value of marginal product, but on average over the year it ought to do so. 
The marginal  condition need not be met week by week-at  least not for all 
employees-precisely  because labor is hired by the year rather than by 
the week. 
A  similar analysis can be applied to  cyclical changes in employment. 
Hourly wage rates may be cyclically unresponsive although they should be 
higher in the more cyclical industries than in the less cyclical ones. The 
cyclical case differs  from the seasonal case only in that the pattern of labor 
demand over time is less predictable. In both,  however, new contracts 
(broadly construed to  include contract-like arrangements) should reflect 
newly formed expectations as to hours of work over the lives of the con- 
tracts. New contracts need not differ from old ones if expected real wages 
and expected cyclical unemployment are unchanged. However, these ex- 
pectations may well change if real wages, cyclical unemployment, govern- 
ment policies, and any other relevant factors differed during the old con- 
tract from expectations when those contracts were signed, provided that 
these once unexpected conditions are now expected to persist. 
The cyclical case, nevertheless, differs from the seasonal case in that, in 
the former, the real wage and amount of unemployment can differ from 
expectations by far larger amounts. Indeed, cyclical uncertainties should 
be analyzed along with uncertainties stemming from micro disturbances. 
Again, why do contracts not provide for greater flexibility in order to re- 
duce the costs of both cyclical and micro disturbances?  If fixed-wage con- 
tracts serve an insurance function, the losses due to cyclical (and other) 
unemployment are analogous to the administrative  costs of a life insurance 
company. Might there be a way for contracting parties to  reduce these 
losses and to share the gains? In principle, contingency clauses could pro- 
vide a mechanism to reduce the losses that arise as contracts get out of date. 
It is, however, no trivial problem for contracting parties to agree on the 
proper measurement of and response to possible future states of the world 
that would justify wage adjustment. Many known possible states will not 
be hedged because the costs of the attempt are too high, and other states 
will arise that are not even in the set of known possible states at the time 
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of-living escalator, and the difficulties with such clauses are nicely illus- 
trated by the growing literature  on the problems with escalators when firms 
are hit by supply shocks. 
As an economy's variance increases, the response of contracting parties 
should be to  increase the use of contingency clauses, but because such 
clauses are only partial remedies, contract periods should also shorten. 
Negotiating relatively often to change wages on the basis of current in- 
formation will be cheaper than bearing the costs of contracts that have 
been outdated in spite of efforts to allow for contingencies. 
In summary, whereas the Friedman-Phelps theory explains unemploy- 
ment by assuming  that workers and firms are unable to distinguish between 
relative and absolute price changes period by period, the contract model 
explains unemployment by assuming that wages and prices are predeter- 
mined period by period. However, the contract model with rational ex- 
pectations provides much more  than  a  rationale for  Keynes'  "sticky" 
wages. It also provides, in principle, an analysis of the effect of the econo- 
my's characteristics on  contract clauses and terms. The more stable is 
an economy, the longer should be the terms of formal contracts and the 
longer should be  the  contract-like understandings that produce lasting 
customer-firm and employee-firm relationships. The major thrust of the 
Friedman-Phelps theory remains intact, but the theory is reinterpreted  as 
applying to contract clauses and contract periods rather than to calendar 
periods. 
Contract theory is not yet sufficiently developed to provide much guid- 
ance to how economic conditions affect clauses and durations. There is, 
therefore, little on which to build structural wage and price equations. A 
reasonable assumption is that expectations of future employment will be 
affected by current employment and, therefore, that the Phillips-curve ap- 
proach to wage formation is serviceable. Nevertheless, the contract theory 
makes clear that this approach can be expected to break down whenever 
labor-market anticipations assume an environment substantially different 
from the past. Similarly, an aggregate price equation specified on stan- 
dardized unit labor costs and the current state of demand in the product 
markets will probably be satisfactory so long as the underlying environ- 
ment  is  stable. 
Of special importance is the fact that contractual arrangements  include 
escape clauses. Both parties to a contract understand  that there are circum- 
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haps  one  party  may  realize  that  it would  be unfair  or impossible  to enforce 
contract  compliance  on the other.  Thus, wage and price  stability-in the 
sense  of wages  and  prices  predetermined  period  by period-can break  down 
quickly  because  the contracting  parties  desire  to maintain  their relation- 
ships  and so must  consider  the effects  of their  demands  on each other. 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  CONSUMPTION  AND  INVESTMENT  FUNCTIONS 
The  contractual  theory  of wage  and  price  determination  has  implications 
for the  macro  model  that  extend  well  beyond  the wage  and  price  equations. 
As first  argued  by Clower,33  the Keynesian  consumption  function  makes 
theoretical  sense  only in a world  in which  hours  of work  are  not a choice 
variable  for the worker.  In the auction-market  model  the worker  chooses 
hours  of work,  consumption,  and saving  simultaneously,  given  his tastes 
and given  the market  wages,  prices,  and interest  rates.  In the contractual 
model  hours of work are not, in the short run, a choice variable  but are 
determined  by firms through decisions on layoffs and overtime  work 
(within  limits). 
In accepting  a (more  or less formal)  contractual  relationship  with  a firm, 
the worker  understands  that hours will be determined  by the firm  in the 
short run. His choice of occupation  and employer  will be determined  in 
accordance  with the neoclassical  model. This choice will reflect  his ex- 
pectations  as to hours of work and the real wage rate over the (perhaps 
vaguely  defined)  contract  period  and,  therefore,  his expectations  as to con- 
sumption  and saving.  Given  that choice,  in any short  period  actual  hours 
and actual  real  wages-and therefore  actual  real  income-may differ  from 
those  expected.  To the  extent  that  income  differs  within  the  range  of normal 
variation,  real  consumption  need  not be affected,  for the reasons  suggested 
by the permanent-income  theory  of the consumption  function. 
Some  fluctuations  of income,  however,  will  be larger  than  those  expected, 
or at least larger  than those for which the worker  is prepared  to adjust 
saving  to hold consumption  constant.  In the business-cycle  context these 
fluctuations  may still not be large  enough  to make  it worthwhile  for many 
contracting  parties  to abandon  their  contractual  relationships,  and so the 
worker  will adjust  his consumption  to reflect  his changed  income.  Here  is 
the Keynesian  consumption  function  in its permanent-income  form. 
33. Robert  Clower,  "The  Keynesian  Counterrevolution:  A Theoretical  Appraisal,"  in 
F. H. Hahn and F. P. R. Brechling,  eds., The Theory  of Interest  Rates (London: Mac- 
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An analogous  argument,  though  one much  less  frequently  heard,  applies 
to the investment  function.34  Assuming,  as seems  the case,  that a great  deal 
of pricing  in product  markets  is also based  on contractual  considerations, 
firms  are constrained  both  to maintain  contractual  prices and to deliver 
goods at those prices.  Just as the worker  may feel compelled  to sacrifice 
his Saturday  afternoon  to overtime  work  at his employer's  request  so also 
the firm  may feel compelled  to deliver  goods at a short-run  loss, and to 
expand  physical  plant  to do so, in order  to maintain  a profitable  longer- 
term  customer  relationship. 
The  neoclassical  investment  function  has the firm  jointly  deciding  output 
and  investment  given  the  production  function,  current  and  expected  market 
prices  for output  and for capital  goods, and the interest  rate.  This model 
has no room for the investment  accelerator  because output is a choice 
variable.  From  the  discussion  above,  however,  this  approach  must  be modi- 
fied to admit the accelerator  to the extent that the contractual  pricing 
theory  is accepted. 
SOURCES  OF BUSINESS-CYCLE  FLUCTUATIONS 
The contractual  theory of wage and price behavior  was originally  de- 
veloped  to provide  a more solid understanding  of the Keynesian  notion 
of wage  and price  rigidity.  As emphasized  above,  the theory  has implica- 
tions for equations  in the macro model other than the wage and price 
equations  because  quantity  adjustments  are implied  by price  rigidity;  but 
it also points  to the sources  of business-cycle  fluctuations. 
The contract  theory  calls for wages  and prices  to be predetermined  but 
not necessarily  unchanging  or even smoothly changing. "Rigidity" of 
wages  and  prices  should  be interpreted  as unresponsiveness  to current  de- 
mand  and not as absence  of response  over time. At the micro  level some 
contractual  understandings  involve  dramatically  changing  prices,  as in sea- 
sonal and peak-load  pricing  and in wage adjustments  after  probationary 
employment  periods. Some contracts  provide for substantial  predeter- 
mined  changes  in price  reflecting  expectations  as to market  demands;  an 
example  is the not uncommon  practice  of giving  one or two months'  free 
34. The role of the accelerator  in investment  theory  has long been questioned.  As far 
as I know, the first  clear  justification  for the accelerator  based on the assumption  that 
firms  are  constrained  in determining  output  appears  in Herschel  I. Grossman,  "A Choice- 
Theoretic  Model of an Income-Investment  Accelerator,"  American  Economic  Review, 
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rent on a one-year apartment  lease, an offer the tenant understands is un- 
likely to be repeated when the lease comes up for renewal. 
These examples, as well as the wide fluctuations in wages and prices 
actually observed, make clear that  "wage and price predetermination" 
should be substituted for "wage and price rigidity." This substitution is 
not just a matter of terminologoy.  If wages and prices were really rigid, or 
even really smoothly changing, there could be no errors in wage and price 
forecasting. But important errors can  arise when, for  example,  a  con- 
tractual wage is not accompanied by the product prices expected by the 
contracting parties. 
In the Keynesian view of the business cycle, errors in price forecasting 
play a small role. The Keynesian position is, I believe, well summarized  by 
Tobin:  "According to  [the general equilibrium approach to  monetary 
theory], the principal way in which financial policies and events affect ag- 
gregate demand is by changing the valuations of physical assets relative to 
their replacement costs."35  The production of new physical assets changes 
because existing "used" assets have valuations-and  market prices when 
such markets exist-that  differ from the prices of new equipment.36 
The replacement costs of physical assets may, however, differ from the 
valuations of existing physical assets because either one changes while the 
other remains constant.  Policies and events-"disturbances"-will  alter 
the relationship between valuations and replacement costs if the disturb- 
ances are imperfectly forecast by sellers of newly produced physical assets 
with predetermined  prices that are (at least in part) based on the forecast. 
The importance of contractual pricing for understanding the business 
cycle is suggested by the following illustration. Consider a firm in a reces- 
sion, with an idle machine similar or even identical to one purchased only 
a few months earlier  during the expansion phase of the cycle. Relationships 
among wages, materials costs, and prices are much like those at the time 
35. James  Tobin, "A General  Equilibrium  Approach  to Monetary  Theory,"  Journal 
of Money,  Credit  and  Banking,  vol. 1 (February  1969),  p. 29. 
36. Identical  goods cannot, of course,  sell at different  prices,  but changes  in the valua- 
tions of existing assets may be interpreted  as bringing  about changes in the prices of 
newly produced  assets, thereby  changing  the flow supply of these assets. Alternatively, 
if the quoted  prices  on newly produced  assets  do not change,  perhaps  for the contractual 
reasons  discussed  earlier,  order  backlogs  will change  or new assets  will be produced  and 
put into service  as rapidly  as the adjustment  costs of new investment  justify.  These costs 
alter the effective  price to the buyer so that the total cost of the new assets equal the 
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the new machine was purchased.37  At the time the investment was put in 
place, it was expected to have a positive return. Suppose, moreover, that 
the depreciation of capital is a function of time rather than of usage. If the 
profitability of operating the machine in the future is independent of the 
profitability of operating it during the recession, then, whatever the ex- 
pected life of the idle machine, its lifetime rate of return can be increased 
if a way can be found to operate it to produce goods that can be sold for 
more than the variable costs  of  production. Why doesn't the firm cut 
prices to a level only slightly above operating costs?38 
If firms operate in competitive markets, in the sense that they have little 
freedom to act independently, the persistence of idle capital accompanied 
by an unchanged real wage rate must stem from factors linking the profit- 
ability of production in one period to the expected profitability of produc- 
tion in subsequent periods. The individual firm can find it profitable to 
keep capital idle only if operating the capital in the recession would reduce 
the expected profitability of operating it when the firm expects to be using 
it anyway.39  Put another way, the firm that lowers its price in this con- 
tractual-pricing  environment-which  links today's pricing decision to to- 
morrow's-believes  that the present value of the expected effects of that 
decision on today's and tomorrow's profits is positive. This type of linkage 
of pricing decisions over time does not exist in the auction-market com- 
petitive model, in which the firm, period by period, sets output at the point 
where marginal cost equals the market-determined  price. 
The contractual-pricing  theory suggests that the expected rate of return 
on an investment project-even  on equipment with a short physical life- 
is determined  primarily by the contribution of the investment to an endur- 
ing line of business requiring enduring customer relationships. Investment 
behavior can be viewed as very similar to consumption behavior. The con- 
siderations  emphasized in the neoclassical investment theory explain firms' 
decisions to  enter (or expand) or leave (or contract) a line of business. 
37. This statement  is justified  by the observation  that real wages display  little cyclical 
pattern-that is, the relationship  between  nominal  prices  and nominal  wages  is not very 
(if at all) cyclical. 
38. The force of this argument  is somewhat  reduced  for capital  that depreciates  with 
usage  rather  than with time because  the variable  cost then includes  depreciation  as well 
as material  and labor costs. This type of capital ought to be used so long as the net 
revenues  generated  exceed  the present  value of expected  net revenues. 
39. In this theory  the individual  firm  has no discretion  over keeping  capital  idle in a 
recession.  If the firm  does not maximize  long-run  profits,  it earns  less than the normal 
competitive  rate of return  and so cannot survive. 494  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1976 
Given  these  decisions,  which  imply  expected  requirements  for capital  plant 
over  time, the current  level of aggregate  demand  will induce  levels of in- 
vestment  that depart  from those expected  earlier.  This argument  suggests 
that investment  might  play a relatively  small  role as a causal  force in the 
business  cycle. 
For the sake  of expositional  clarity,  take a set of assumptions  generating 
results  at the opposite  extreme  from the Keynesian  emphasis  on the im- 
portance  of investment  in the business  cycle. Suppose  that (a) the neo- 
classical  consumption  and investment  models together  determine  a real 
rate of interest  that, averaged  over the cycle, is constant  in the long run 
and is so recognized  by business  firms;  (b) all investment  is long-lived  be- 
cause  physical  capital  has a long life, or contractual  considerations  require 
long-term  commitments  to a line of business,  or some combination  of the 
two; (c) the "long  run"  is a length  of time spanning  a number  of expected 
business  cycles  of normal  duration,  but of unexpected  timing.40 
With these assumptions,  the short-run  elasticity  of investment  demand 
with  respect  to the real  interest  rate  will  be high.4'  In the Keynesian  model, 
the IS function  will be almiost  fiat  at a nominal  rate  of interest  equal  to the 
long-run  equilibrium  real rate  plus the expected  rate of inflation.  Policies 
and  events  move  this  IS function  by affecting  the expected  rate  of inflation; 
changes  in the expected  return  on capital  are assumed  to be unimportant 
by virtue  of the assumption  that firms  confidently  expect  the real rate of 
return  to remain  essentially  constant. 
This  set of analytical  results  contrasts  with  the standard  Keynesian  view 
that the real rate of interest  ought to have a marked  cyclical  pattern.  In 
terms  of the IS-LM  model, shifts  in the IS function  induce  positively  cor- 
related  changes  in real income and real interest.  While shifts in the LM 
function  cause  negatively  correlated  changes  in income  and interest  for a 
given  IS function,  the latter  function,  as conventionally  interpreted,  cannot 
in fact remain  fixed due to the operation  of the investment  accelerator. 
The view outlined  above depicting  a fairly  stable  and flat IS curve  may 
appear,  on its face, to be inconsistent  with the observed  cyclical  volatility 
of both investment  expenditures  and stock-market  valuations  of existing 
capital.  But, given the assumptions  above, these features  of the business 
cycle  should  not be interpreted  within  the neoclassical  model  of investment. 
40. This assumption  is needed to make this argument  consistent  with the earlier  one 
that contractually  determined  wages  and prices  do not perfectly  anticipate  disturbances. 
41. Changes  in the first several coupons on a perpetuity  will, for a given price of 
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Under the assumptions  of the contractual-pricing  model, the real rate of 
return  on investment  does not fluctuate  cyclically  as much as the cyclical 
behavior  of investment  would  suggest.  In a boom,  much  of the investment 
has a low return  when  calculated  in the conventional  manner  over  the life 
of the physical  assets  involved;  but this  investment  is nevertheless  required 
to meet customer  demands  at predetermined  prices.  In a recession,  much 
of investment  reflects  commitments  to new markets  promising  relatively 
higher  long-run  returns. 
Fluctuations  in the stock  market  reflect  not only changes  in anticipated 
rates  of return  but also realized  returns.  A firm  whose  factory  burns  down 
is worth  less than  before  regardless  of anticipated  returns  on new invest- 
ment. Similarly,  firms  sometimes  make investments  that prove worthless 
and hence  reduce  their  worth. 
With  the onset  of recession  the typical  firm  will have made these  kinds 
of mistakes.  It will have made some capital  investments  with short  lives, 
will have accumulated  some excess  inventories,  and will have made  some 
investments  in hiring and training  labor that are completely  lost when 
workers  who are laid off do not return.  A decline  in the stock market, 
therefore,  need  not reflect  any  change  in the valuation  of the representative 
firm's  long-term  capital which consists of both the long-lived  physical 
assets  and the "good will"  that reflects  the capitalized  value of the firm's 
relationships  with  its customers. 
In a similar  vein,  this  approach  also can account  for declines  in the stock 
market  when  aggregate  demand  is excessive.  In a boom, firms  must meet 
greater  than  expected  demands  at contractually  determined  prices,  and  the 
costs of doing  so will be high.  If the demands  had been anticipated,  prices 
would  have  been  higher,  or investment  expanded  earlier,  to provide  addi- 
tional  capacity  with normal  and efficient  lead times. 
Because  demands  fluctuate  unexpectedly,  the firm  constrained  by con- 
tractual  pricing  will want to maintain  some capacity  that is "excess"  in a 
physical  sense  but  not in an economic  sense.  Customers,  by the contractual 
theory,  are  willing  to pay a higher  expected  price  in return  for the benefits 
of a contractually  determined  price  and the assurance  that their  demands 
at that price  will be met. 
Corporate  profits  should be highest  when realized  demands  are above 
those  expected  but  below  those  that  strain  capacity.42  Firms  receive  a wind- 
fall  by operating  at these  levels  because  their  contractual-price  and  capacity 
42. Output  is rarely  strictly  constrained  by physical  limitations,  but a careful  defini- 
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decisions provided for some excess capacity. The windfall gains occur for 
the same reasons as the unexpected losses discussed in the two preceding 
paragraphs. 
The above analysis was based on the extreme assumption that in the 
aggregate firms correctly perceive that the long-run expected real rate of 
return  to investment is constant. Actual returns differ from those expected 
because actual demands differ from those expected; and, in this model, 
unanticipated demands will be reflected in aggregate output. In fact they 
will also be reflected in unanticipated price changes. The unexpected de- 
mands on  firms subject to  contractual-pricing constraints will generate 
derived demands in the auction markets for primary materials, and newly 
"negotiated" contracts will provide for  changes in  prices. These price 
changes will be unanticipated because the demands that occasioned them 
were unanticipated. 
Unanticipated price changes get little weight in the Keynesian analysis, 
which emphasizes changes in the expected return on investment. While the 
Keynesian considerations may have been relatively  important in the United 
States during the 1930s, there is evidence that unanticipated price changes 
have been important forces in the period since World War II. A recent 
study of the Treasury bill market by Eugene Fama suggests that, for his 
sample period (January 1953 to  July 1971), errors in forecasting prices 
played a relatively important role in the cyclical process.43  Fama's findings, 
which are discussed below, provide direct evidence on the magnitude of 
such errors. In addition, they are suggestive of a highly interest-elastic IS 
function if it can be assumed that the expected yields on different types of 
securities move together. This assumption is not unreasonable, as applied 
to Treasury bills and common stocks, but in the present context the possi- 
bility that the risk premium on equities might have a cyclical pattern poses 
an important question.44 
Fama examined the behavior over time of the realized real rate of return 
on U.S. Treasury bills-the  nominal holding-period yield plus the rate of 
change in the purchasing power of money (calculated from the consumer 
price index)-and  found that the ex post real rate of interest has a sub- 
43. Eugene  F. Fama, "Short-Term  Interest  Rates as Predictors  of Inflation,"  Ameri- 
can Economic Review, vol.  65 (June 1975), pp. 269-82. 
44. The efficient-markets  literature  provides  a presumption  that the risk premium  has 
no cyclical  pattern.  As far as I know, there is no evidence  that a stock-market  trading 
rule based, say, on the most recently observed unemployment  rate promises higher 
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stantial variance and is serially uncorrelated. The absence of serial correla- 
tion in the real rate on bills is surprising, given the Keynesian position, in 
light of the high serial correlation of unemployment. 
Fama reports  that, over his entire sample period, the mean and standard 
deviation of the annual real rate of return from holding one-month bills 
are 0.89 percent and 2.36 percent, respectively. On three-month bills the 
corresponding figures are 1.22 percent and 1.48 percent. Over a shorter 
sample period, March 1959 to  July  1971, Fama  found  the  mean  and 
standard deviation on one-month bills to be 1.08 and 2.03 percent, respec- 
tively; on three-month bills, 1.49 and 1.23, respectively; and on six-month 
bills, 1.76 and 0.89, respectively.45 
Since the standard deviations are relatively large compared with the 
means, accelerating or postponing planned purchases of goods frequently 
would have been profitable if price changes on  goods  could have been 
anticipated. Since Fama found a substantial degree of serial dependence in 
changes in the CPI but none in the real interest rate, and since serial de- 
pendence provides information useful for forecasting, a reasonable infer- 
ence is that short-run price speculation, in the form  of  changes in the 
timing of goods purchases, does exist. According to Fama's results, this 
speculation eliminates serial dependence from the real rate on bills but not 
from changes in the CPI. The latter result stands in marked contrast to 
the behavior of prices of commodities traded in auction markets. 
Within the context of a goods-bills-money inventory model,'6 the im- 
plication is that an increase in expected inflation leads buyers of goods to 
expand their inventories of goods and reduce their inventories of bills and 
money. The sellers of contractually priced goods are quantity takers in the 
short run, and so they end up with larger inventories of bills and money. 
Their physical inventories of goods may decline or they may expand out- 
put or both. Since many economic units are simultaneously buyers and 
sellers  in markets characterized  by contractual pricing, the aggregate  effects 
of short-run price speculation are a change in the bill rate and some mix 
45. Ibid.,  table 7, p. 280. Fama's  table  reports  results  at rates  per  period;  I have  multi- 
plied by 12, 4, and 2 as appropriate  to express  his results  at annual  rates. 
46. Such  models have  been worked  out by Edgar  L. Feige and Michael  Parkin,  "The 
Optimal  Quantity  of Money, Bonds, Commodity  Inventories,  and Capital,"  American 
Econiomic  Review,  vol. 61 (June 1971),  pp. 335-49; and by Anthony M. Santomero,  "A 
Model of the Demand  for Money by Households,"  Journal  of Finanice,  vol. 29 (March 
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of changes  in aggregate  activity  and aggregate  business  inventories.47  With 
contractual  pricing  the firm  presumably  makes relatively  small errors  in 
forecasting  its own  selling  prices  in the  near  term  because  it sets  those  prices 
and  knows  its own plans.  But the representative  firm  can, and apparently 
does,  make  errors  with respect  to the prices  of goods it buys.48 
It appears  reasonable,  then, to believe  that short-run  speculation  takes 
place on changes  in the CPI. But the magnitude  of the price  forecasting 
errors  in Fama's findings,  along with the evidence  that the short-run 
Phillips  curve  is far  from  vertical,  implies  that  firms  must  frequently  be sur- 
prised  by changes  in demand.  This inference  is justified  by the fact that 
many  firms  are involved  simultaneously  in the goods markets  and in the 
bill market.  A firm that makes forecasting  errors  in the one must also 
make  forecasting  errors  in the other. 
As noted  earlier,  the absence  of serial  correlation  in the ex post real  rate 
on bills is consistent  with the view that changes  in the expected  rate of 
return  on investment  play only a small  role in the cyclical  process  and is 
inconsistent  with the standard  Keynesian  view that the real interest  rate 
has a marked  cyclical  pattern.  However,  Fama's  conclusion  in this regard 
might  be criticized  on the ground  that  he should  have  employed  a cyclical 
variable,  such as the unemployment  rate,  to pick up the cyclical  behavior 
of the ex ante  (or expected)  real  rate  of interest.  If this argument  were  cor- 
rect, an equation  using only the Treasury  bill rate to forecast  inflation- 
one in which the cyclical  variable  is omitted-should have serially  cor- 
related  residuals  because the omitted variable  is known to be serially 
correlated.  But Fama  found no evidence  of significant  serial  correlation. 
In a comment  on the  Fama  paper,  Nelson  and  Schwert  argue  that  Fama's 
test for constancy  in the ex ante  real  rate  of interest  is very  weak.49  The ex 
47. Note that for intermediate  products, price speculation  may simply redistribute 
inventories  between  buyers  and sellers  of such products  and yet may affect  the bill rate. 
48. Strictly  speaking,  this argument  does not apply  to the CPI since that index covers 
goods purchased  by households.  It is certainly  possible  that input  prices  are  forecast  with 
little error,  that the bill rate adjusts  to reflect  those forecasts  as firms  alter their inven- 
tories of bills and input goods, and that the variance  of the real rate of return  on bills 
calculated  from the CPI stems from the resulting  variability  of the bill rate rather  than 
from errors  in forecasting  CPI prices.  Since households  own a relatively  small fraction 
of the dollar  value of outstanding  bills, they have no way of switching  between  bills and 
goods inventories.  While this argument  may have some validity, many large retailing 
firms  must be buying CPI goods at prices highly correlated  with those that final con- 
sumers  actually  pay; these firms do have the option of adjusting  their goods and bills 
inventories. 
49. C. R. Nelson and G. W. Schwert,  "On  Testing  the Hypothesis  that the Real Rate 
of Interest  Is Constant,"  American  Economic  Review,  forthcoming,  1977. William Poole  499 
post real  rate on Treasury  bills  equals  the ex ante real rate plus the error 
in forecasting  the rate of inflation.  If the inflation  forecasting  errors  are 
serially  independent,  as they should be under rational  expectations,  the 
higher  is the variance  of the forecasting  error  relative  to the variance  of a 
serially  correlated  ex ante  real  rate of interest,  the lower will be the serial 
correlation  of the ex post real  rate. 
Employing  several  different  time-series  models of the monthly  CPI and 
some simplifying  assumptions,  Nelson and Schwert  conclude that the 
standard  deviation  of the monthly  ex ante  real  rate on bills is between  0.7 
and 1.3, expressed  at an annual  rate.50  Consider  a first-order  process  for 
the real  rate,  i, such  as 
it-  k it-,  +  wt. 
Various  pairs  of k and o2 appear  consistent  with the evidence,  but if k is 
almost 1.0-so  that the serial dependence is high-  2  is small enough that 
the variance  of i is still small  compared  with the variance  of the inflation 
forecast  errors.  Nelson  and  Schwert  find  that  the  inflation  forecasting  errors 
are  60 to 80 percent  of the total variance  of about  5.2 percent  annual  rate 
in the ex post real rate on Treasury  bills month to month for the period 
from  January  1953  through  July 1971. 
For the purposes  of this paper,  therefore,  the Nelson and Schwert  find- 
ings  reinforce  the Fama  findings.  Changes  in the CPI  are  serially  correlated 
to a significant  extent, and whatever  the serial  correlation  in the ex ante 
real  rate,  its variance  is small compared  with that in inflation  forecasting 
errors.  These  findings  suggest  that  fluctuations  in real  activity  in the United 
States  since 1953  are more likely to be related  to price  forecasting  errors 
than  to responses  to interest  rates  given  smoothly  changing,  and therefore 
predictable,  prices.5" 
50. Ibid. 
51. A nearly constant ex ante real rate of interest could be the result of a nearly 
horizontal  LM function  rather  than of a nearly  horizontal  IS function,  but this explana- 
tion seems unsatisfactory.  The demand for real money balances is almost universally 
specified  as a function of the nominal rate of interest  (interest on money is assumed 
zero); and since the interest  elasticity of the demand for money is not high-at  least 
at the present  time-a  flat LM function relative  to the real rate of interest would re- 
quire that the central  bank be reasonably  successful  in adjusting  the nominal money 
stock proportionally  to fluctuations  in both the general price level and real income. 
But it is quite clear that, historically,  central  bank policy has emphasized  stabilization 
of the nominal  rate of interest  rather  than of the real rate. 500  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1976 
CONTRACTUAL  PRICING:  SOME FURTHER  COMMENTS 
The contractual  theory of wage and price determination  has great appeal. 
In qualitative terms its predictions fit the facts of the labor market and of 
many product markets. It is consistent with the permanent-income theory 
of consumption and with a theory of investment assigning a major role to 
the accelerator, theories that have proven successful in empirical studies 
of cyclical fluctuations. 
The difficulty with the contractual theory at the current state of its de- 
velopment is that it  offers more insight into  why wages and prices are 
unresponsive  to current  demand than into why they change. What is needed 
is  an explanation of  the factors that determine the place  of  particular 
markets on the continuum between the three-year wage contract and the 
auction market. The same analysis ought to be capable of explaining why 
three-year labor  contracts  characterize stable  periods  and  weekly  (or 
shorter) contracts emerge in hyperinflation. Presumably the answer has 
something to  do with the volatilities in the aggregate price level and in 
relative prices, and perhaps the type of  analysis worked out by  Lucas 
provides the ingredients essential to the needed theory. 
In any event, the contract theory should be interpreted  as an explanation 
of the failure of wages and prices to behave as if they were determined in 
auction markets; the theory does not imply that all the wages and prices 
relevant to  individual  decisionmakers are  highly  predictable. Even  if 
changes in the expected rate of return on capital are large, there should be 
no business cycle if the market-clearing  wages and prices implied by vola- 
tile expected returns are predictable. Some  wages and prices might be 
smoothed for the convenience of the parties involved, as in the payment of 
nine-month teacher salaries in twelve equal installments, but no one would 
knowingly insist on wages and prices that would lead to large-scale unem- 
ployment.  Uncertainty is  exactly  what  generates the  demand for  con- 
tractually determined wages and prices and so wage and price forecasting 
errors must play some role in the cyclical process. 
Even if the argument deemphasizing changes in the expected return on 
investment is viewed as non-Keynesian, the argument just  nmlade  is  de- 
cidedly Keynesian in that it emphasizes wage and price "rigidities." The 
argument is also decidedly Keynesian in its stress on induced changes in 
expenditures, which arise not only from the Keynesian consumption func- 
tion and the "multiplier"  that may be calculated from it, but also from the William Poole  501 
investment  accelerator  mechanism.  In the light of these observations,  the 
monetarist  view  of the cycle  should  be regarded  as non-Keynesian  only in 
the sense of emphasizing  monetary  disturbances  rather  than disturbances 
in the expected  return  on capital. 
Policy in a Rational-Expectations  Model 
In  contrast to  the  Sargent-Wallace results, the  argument made  here 
retains  both the potential  for government  macro policy to be stabiliz- 
ing and the rational-expectations  hypothesis.  It is against  their own in- 
terests  for individual  households  and firms  to behave  in such a way as to 
offset  all the aggregate  effects  of unforeseen  disturbances.  If the govern- 
ment can identify  short-run  disturbances  and offset them, macro policy 
can be successful. 
Suppose,  for a moment,  that government  policy responses  are well de- 
fined  and  measurable,  and  that  they offset  some of the effects  on aggregate 
output  that would occur  in their  total absence.  With contractual  pricing, 
such offsets  are  possible  because  the government  can seek to mitigate  dis- 
turbances  that private  parties, bound by contracts,  must endure. This 
result  does not depend  on differential  information:  it requires  only that 
when  new  information  arrives  the government  be able  to respond  in ways 
not available  to private  parties  bound  together  in contractual  relationships. 
If the government  response  function  is optimally  formed,  contracting 
parties  need  do nothing  but "grin  and enjoy  it." However,  if the response 
is systematically  too much  or too little,  private  parties  might  want  to define 
contract  contingency  clauses  on government  policy variables  just as they 
now  do on the  CPI.  In addition,  because  of varying  tastes  in the  population, 
"optimal"  policy adjustments  by the government  cannot be defined  pre- 
cisely.  Private  attitudes  toward  unemployment  and inflation  differ,  and so 
in principle  some private  contract  clauses could be tied to government 
policy  variables  in one way, and some in another. 
This  line  of argument  might  appear  to rescue  the Sargent-Wallace  results 
in a world of contractual  pricing  since the tastes of contracting  parties 
could  undo  any  action  the government  might  take reflecting  its tastes.  But 
its emptiness  can be seen by going one step further.  Rather  than change 
policy, the government  could simply announce  its view on the optimal 
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wages  and  prices  as required  by a contract  clause  reflecting  the relation  of 
their  tastes  to the government's.  If a clause  could be written  on a policy 
variable,  one could also be written  on the government's  announcement  of 
the "optimal"  price  level. 
If contingency  clauses  written  on underlying  disturbances  cannot  be sat- 
isfactorily  defined-as was  argued  in the section  on the contract  theory-it 
is difficult  to imagine  that  clauses  defined  on government  policies  could  be 
satisfactorily  defined.  In addition,  such clauses obviously  would pose a 
moral  hazard.  For better  or worse,  much  private  activity  is already  moti- 
vated  by a desire  to avoid  regulations  and taxes. 
Attempts  to restore  the Sargent-Wallace  results  through  the contingency- 
clause arguments  are not credible  and so the feasibility  of stabilization 
policy cannot be theorized  away. Nevertheless,  a rational contracting 
theory  does amend  traditional  policy analysis  in two interesting  ways. 
First, the predictable  part of stabilization  policy has two effects.  These 
arise  because  wages are determined  contractually,  and therefore  are pre- 
determined  in the short  run,  but, at the same  time,  the length  of contracts 
and the willingness  of contracting  parties  to reopen  them depend  on the 
variance  of the economy.  If stabilization  policy is successful,  in the sense 
of reducing  the short-run  variance  of both output  and prices,  not only is 
the economy  stabilized  but price  and wage  predeternlination  spreads  as it 
becomes optimal for the private  sector to lengthen  contracts.  The per- 
sistence  of unemployment,  when  it occurs,  is also increased.  The converse 
of this argument-the effects  of a stabilization  policy that aggravates  in- 
stability  by failing  to offset  other  disturbances-also  holds. 
Once an economy  has adjusted  fully to a new policy by changing  con- 
tract  periods  and other  "institutions,"  the policy will not be as stabilizing 
or destabilizing  in terms of employment  as would have been estimated 
before  it was  introduced.  When  the stabilization  authorities  are  successful, 
the private  sector  will devote  fewer  resources  to such activities  as frequent 
renegotiation  of contracts.  As the public  learns  and  adapts  to a new  policy, 
the policy  will come  to appear  less successful,  or less harmful.  Old policies 
"won't  work  the way  they  used to." Stabilization  activists  may search  for 
new policies,  while the incentive  to reform  poor policies  may fall as the 
private  sector  adapts  and reduces  the damage  done. 
Second,  when  the economy  is well adjusted  to a successful  policy,  it will 
be more dependent  on that policy. With longer contracts  in force, less 
short-run  wage and price  flexibility  is available.  If, after a successful  era, William  Poole  503 
government  policy stops offsetting  private  disturbances  and instead  itself 
becomes a source of disturbances,  aggregate  activity will be seriously 
affected.  If this  line  of argument  is supported  by additional  evidence,  it may 
explain  why  the 1920-21  collapse  of prices  was  accompanied  by a recession 
while  the 1930-33  collapse  was accompanied  by a depression:  the turmoil 
of World  War  I made  it relatively  easy  to adjust  in 1920,  while  the stability 
of the 1920s  contributed  to the disaster  of the 1930s. 
A Few  Final  Comments 
My purpose  has  been  to see  how far  the rational-expectations  hypothesis 
can be pushed  while  still yielding  predictions  consistent  with  the principal 
empirical  regularities  of business  cycles,  and  to explore  the implications  of 
the hypothesis  for macro  theory. 
The assumption  of short-run  wage and price  predetermination  appears 
consistent  with observed  behavior  in the labor  market,  with the observed 
serial  dependence  in changes  in general  wages  and  prices,  with  the observed 
serial  dependence  in unemployment,  and  with  the absence  of a pronounced 
cyclical  pattern  in the real  rate  of interest  on securities.  Wage  predetermi- 
nation,  in turn, arises  because  individuals  and firms  have an incentive  to 
protect  investments  in a job and a community,  and because no direct 
market  mechanism  exists  through  which  spatial  and  temporal  wage  differ- 
entials  in excess  of those  reflecting  equalizing  differences  can be arbitraged 
away  by specialized  and efficient  arbitrageurs.  The observed  difference  in 
behavior  of wages  and auction-market  prices  is consistent  with the differ- 
ence in storage costs of labor and auction-market  goods. Finally, the 
observed  cross-section  differences  in Phillips-curve  slope parameters  and 
unemployment-persistence  parameters  appear  consistent  with rational  ad- 
justment of contracting  conventions and institutions  to  an economy's 
variance. 
The implications  of  the rational-expectations  hypothesis for macro 
modeling  are  profound  because  of the need  to solve  simultaneously  for the 
currently  anticipated  value  of a variable  and  its  future  value  calculated  from 
the model.  This  point is of greatest  importance  for the auction  markets  in 
financial  assets  and commodities.  These  markets  embody  efficient  mecha- 
nisms  of futures  trading  and  inventory  speculation.  In the  labor  market  the 
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pected values is weaker;  hence, it is possible that neither  current  nor 
anticipated  near-term  market  conditions  will have much  effect  on current 
wages.  However,  reactions  that seem irrationally  sluggish  are frequently 
the result  of prior contractual  agreements  or new contracts  that reflect 
correctly  formed  expectations  about  averages,  which  tend  to change  slowly, 
over a fairly  long contract  period.  Thus, private  labor markets  do react 
eventually  to changed  conditions,  and may be no more sluggish  in their 
reactions  than would the "perfect  observer"  bound by contractual  con- 
siderations.  Hence,  any  predictions  or policy advice  based  on the assump- 
tion of irrationally  sluggish  behavior  should  be made with great  caution. 
The rational-expectations  theory  should  not be interpreted  so tightly  as 
to leave no room for learning  behavior.  When scientific  knowledge  ad- 
vances,  presumably  the producer  of the advance  knows  of it first.  In terms 
of fundamental  knowledge  of business-cycle  processes,  it is reasonable  to 
presume  that ordinarily  the economist  is ahead  of the market;  however,  it 
should  not be presumed  that the economist  has a large  margin  of superi- 
ority  in obtaining  and interpreting  the significance  of routine  information 
within  the context  of the "established"  state of knowledge.  Superiority  in 
the creation  of fundamental  knowledge  does not necessarily  imply  superi- 
ority  in its application. 
Rational-expectations  theory might be regarded,  in principle,  as only 
slightly  amending  perfect-certainty  models. One need only substitute  the 
assumption  of perfect  knowledge  of probability  distributions  for the as- 
sumption  of perfect  knowledge  of outcomes.  For problems  in which  proba- 
bility  distributions  are  reasonably  stable  and  in which  the distributions  can 
be estimated,  stochastic  models  quite  clearly  have  been productive. 
I would conjecture,  however,  that the major  source of the uneasiness 
many  economists  feel about rational-expectations  theories  is not the sub- 
stitution  of stochastic  models  for certainty  models  per se but the existence 
of learning  behavior.  No economist  is disturbed  about  stochastic  models 
of gambling  behavior  in Las  Vegas  based  on the assumption  that  the  proba- 
bility distributions  are known; and when  the games  are changed,  econo- 
mists'  predictions  of betting  behavior  quite  naturally  change.  In business- 
cycle  theory,  however,  the rules  of the games  played  are  rarely  well  defined. 
While  the rational-expectations  literature  does make clear  that when  the 
game odds change-either because  the environment  changes  or because 
knowledge  of the environment  changes-changes in behavior  are to be 
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speed with which economic agents learn of the changed odds. If the odds 
change by relatively  small amounts, it is not a priori unreasonable to build 
models of behavior on the assumption that people learn slowly, provided 
that it is assumed that people do learn. 
The existence of learning behavior poses a major problem for assessing 
the rationality of past behavior. It is not surprising,  for example, that data 
publicly available in 1929 can now be interpreted as convincing evidence 
that the handwriting was on the wall. But the rationality of  1929 market 
participants, government policymakers, and economists ought not to be 
judged by 1976 standards. 
At this stage of its development, rational-expectations theory has pro- 
vided much more insight into the failures of empirical macro models than 
into  the  construction of  successful  ones.  The  application of  rational- 
expectations theory to  the construction of  empirical models and to  the 
analysis of behavior requires joint tests of behaviorial hypotheses of the 
usual type and hypotheses concerning what at any particular time it was 
"rational" for people to believe about the future paths of exogenous vari- 
ables and about the system solution determining  the endogenous variables. 
Economists have progressed  from Keynes' apparently  untestable assertions 
about psychologically determined anticipations to a theory that calls for, 
among other things, modeling the political process to determine what it is 
rational to  believe about future government behavior. But because all 
"new" information is, after all, unpredictable in the rational-expectations 
theory, "miscellaneous spirits" determine the paths of exogeneous vari- 
ables, requiring only slight amendments to the role assigned to  "animal 
spirits" in the General  Theory. Since point forecasts, whether rationally or 
irrationally  formed, are almost never exactly correct, the importance of the 
rational-expectations theory for macro problems is less a matter of  de- 
emphasizing  forecasting errors than a matter of providing theoretical guid- 
ance into why such errors might be associated with the business cycle. The 
key contribution of this literature for business-cycle analysis, then, is that 
it lays the foundations for an economic theory to replace an institutional 
theory of wage and price rigidity. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Edmund  S. Phelps:  There  are  two key propositions  in William  Poole's  dis- 
cussion of the wage sector. The first of these is that the models in the 
"Phelps  volume"  cannot explain  the observed  persistence  of booms and 
slumps:  "Since  forecast  errors  cannot  be serially  correlated  under  rational 
expectations, the theory must .  . .  appeal to  some  other mechanism to 
explain  the observed  persistence  . ..  of unemployment."  He is referring  to 
that version  of the theory  in which all prices  and wages are reset period 
by period-say,  quarterly.  And the critical  mechanism  omitted in that 
version  is thought  to be the practice  of long-lived  wage  contracts. 
I would  not dream  of suggesting  that those models are serviceable  for 
each and every episode of boom and bust in the history of the world. 
Certainly,  there  are  features  of the Great  Depression  that the "textbook" 
version  of the  theory  cannot  explain  well  or at all-not,  at any  rate,  without 
amendments  or extensions.  Nevertheless,  I am surprised  at the growing 
consensus  that the framework  of the models  in the Phelps  volume  cannot 
account  for any systematic  persistence  of unemployment  above or below 
the natural  rate. 
We all agree  that stochastic  disturbances  that are serially  independent 
can produce  series  of "runs"  in forecast  errors  and hence deviations  of 
unemployment  from  the  natural  rate.  We  also  agree  that  we want  the  theory 
to be able  to explain  "more"  persistence  than  that.  Let me give  a couple  of 
examples  that go further-the second  much  further  than  the first-toward 
explaining  the degree of persistence  shown by the unemployment  rate, 
without  invoking  some "other  mechanism"  like long-lived  contracts. 
Consider  a war  of unknown  duration.  In each quarter  that it persists  it 
is financed  with  newly  printed  money  amounting  to k in real  terms.  At the 
end of any  period  in which  the war  is still on, there  is a fairly  high proba- 
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bility-but less than 100  percent-that the war  will persist  for at least the 
next  period;  if no war  were  on, the corresponding  conditional  probability 
of a war  (of size k) would  be pretty  small.  Then,  even  if the war  proves  to 
be of only average  duration,  it elicits a series of underestimates  of new 
money  printed  because  the persistence  of the war  for that long was never 
a certainty.  What  is noteworthy  about this example  is that the serial  de- 
pendence  of wars  tends  to produce  serial  dependence  in the algebraic  sign 
of the expectational  errors:  if money creation  was underpredicted  last 
period,  the probability  is high that it will be underpredicted  again this 
period if the primary  disturbance,  like a war, exhibits imperfect  serial 
dependence.  A limitation  of this example,  obviously,  is that quite  possibly 
the  conditional  expected  value  of unemployment  next  period  is independent 
of the unemployment  rate  this period  while  the war  is on. The interesting 
feature  is that,  in warlike  epochs,  low unemployment  in the current  period 
is followed  more  times  than  not by low unemployment  in the next period; 
when  peace  breaks  out, unemployment  rises  a lot. 
My second  example  is one to which  rational  expectations  simply  cannot 
be applied.  Situations  may  arise-and maybe  the rise  in the price  of oil was 
one-in  which  an expectational  impasse  occurs:  labor  expects  the central 
bank  to raise  the money  supply  in order  to increase  employment,  and so 
does not lower  the money  wage.  But, since  the central  bank  expects  labor 
to reduce  its money wage to the same end, it does not raise the money 
supply.  Neither  does the  job because  each  expects  the other  to do it. This 
impasse  and resulting  disappointment  of expectations  can go on quarter 
after  quarter  unless  and  until  the "two"  parties  start  talking  to each  other. 
I suspect  that this kind of noncooperative-conflict  model of inconsistent 
expectations  opens  up possibilities  for a theory  of catastrophic  depressions 
and hyperinflations,  and that such an approach  will prove to be more 
plausible  than models  that, insisting  on rational  expectations,  purport  to 
solve the problem  by recourse  to very long-lived  money-wage  contracts. 
Let me add, in connection  with Poole's  characterization  of the "Fried- 
man-Phelps"  theory,  that the longevity  of wage bargains  was recognized 
to some degree.  My paper  on money-wage  dynamics  discussed  a leapfrog 
process  in which  firms  take  turns  revising  their  money-wage  commitments 
lasting  a year  or so. But it is fair  to say that in those days we did not yet 
have a satisfying  theory  of the longevity  of wage commitments.  Nor had 
we come to grips  with the ways by which such commitments  might be 
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The second  proposition  in Poole's paper  that I want to discuss  is his 
contention  that the mid-seventies  contract  theory  of Azariadis  and Baily 
and Gordon rescues  the potency of monetary  policy from the jaws of 
Sargent-Wallace.  I think  Poole's  notion  is that overlapping  wage  contracts 
cause  some  money  wage  rates  in the economy  to be predetermined;  hence, 
the central  bank  can control  the ratio of the current  money  supply  to the 
current  average  money  wage  and thus exercise  some leverage  over output 
and employment,  even though it is making a predictable  response  to a 
current  disturbance  not previously  anticipated  when ongoing wage con- 
tracts  were  written. 
Unquestionably,  current  research  is pointing  in this direction,  but the 
road is paved  with difficulties.  It is possible,  though  not totally realistic, 
that each contract  presets  a variable  path of the money wage for some 
period  of time. Then, for example,  if every outstanding  contract  expired 
within  a year,  and  expectations  are  rational,  the system  can be "expected" 
to return  to the natural  unemployment  rate within  a year after  a disturb- 
ance;  predictable  monetary  policy  can make  a difference  (for the speed  of 
the return)  only over those 365 days. So are we to take it, in accounting 
for the persistence  of slumps  and booms, that most contracts  are  longer- 
lived than one year?  Or do contracts  instead  specify  a single  number  for 
the money  wage,  and, if so, why? 
A second  difficulty  is that contract  theory  has not yet really  determined 
the length of implicit  wage contracts.  In Azariadis'  model, one doesn't 
know whether  the contract  extends  over the life of the worker  or just for 
one day. 
The last difficulty  is that, when imbedded  in a standard  macro  model, 
contract  theory,  far from  rescuing  monetary  policy, actually  neutralizes  it 
because  the theory  implies  that money  wages  would  be indexed  to certain 
nominal  variables  like the price  level, or the money  supply  itself, or both, 
in such a way that employment  and the real wage were invariant  to the 
currently  expectable  stock of money. Optimal  contracts  would help to 
"automate"  the Sargent-Wallace  results.  This conclusion  is no doubt an 
overliteral  reading  that  neglects  many  real-world  aspects,  but  the neutrality 
implication  is there. 
My colleague  Guillermo  Calvo  and  I have  begun  the development  of an 
employment-contingent  contract  theory  that escapes  the neutrality  impli- 
cation.  Existing  contract  theory  is state-contingent:  every  worker,  as well 
as every  manager,  can observe  the state  without  cost or can inform  himself 
of the state  without  risk  of deception.  In the new  theory  only  readily  visible William  Poole  509 
variables  like  employment  and  the price  level  are  observed  by workers  and 
contracts  are  expressed  in those  terms.  A rise of the price  level  (relative  to 
the money supply)  serves  as a signal  to workers  that a supply  shock (or 
something  analogous)  has occurred  so that the unobserved  state  warrants 
a fall of the real  wage  (at each  level of employment).  Monetary  policy  can 
then play the useful  role of amplifying  this signal  by boosting  the price 
level.  Rational  contracts  will not undo  the central  bank's  effort  to be help- 
ful by perversely  adopting  the 100 percent  escalator  clause or other  neu- 
tralizing  indexations. 
Martin  N. Baily:  Overall  I enjoyed  this  paper  very  much,  and  found  it full 
of interesting  and provocative  ideas, many of which I agreed  with. In 
particular,  I was pleased  to see that Poole recommends  that the contract 
approach  be applied  to wages  and prices. 
The greater  part of the paper  discusses  rational  expectations  and their 
implications.  Poole first  asserts  that speculation  must  be stabilizing  if it is 
profitable  and that only speculators  who make  a profit  will remain  in the 
market.  This assertion  should  be qualified  in two ways.  Speculation  could 
be stabilizing  most of the time  and  hence  profitable  overall,  but speculators 
still could  be subject  to periodic  panics  or booms that were  disruptive  in 
the short  run. Further,  even though a loss-making  speculator  may leave 
the  market,  a new "sucker"  may  arrive  to replace  him,  thereby  maintaining 
the stock  of loss-makers. 
Poole  then  argues  that  even  though  some  individuals  may  have  irrational 
expectations,  the market  overall  will still have rational  expectations  be- 
cause  other  individuals,  rational  and well  informed,  arbitrage  or offset  the 
irrational  ones. However,  a sane man in an insane  world  does not neces- 
sarily  make  money.  The  idea  that  there  is no easy  way  to make  large  profits 
in an asset market  by using widely available  information  is well docu- 
mented  and almost  certainly  correct.  This is not necessarily  evidence  of a 
close link between  market  expectations  and some true probability  dis- 
tribution  that may be derived  from an understanding  of the underlying 
economic  process.  I have  always  felt that  the assumption  of rational  prefer- 
ence orderings  by consumers  was pretty  strong,  and rational  expectations 
represent  a higher  order  of rationality  that may be violated  more often. 
In addition,  many  outcomes  are unique  and cannot  be broken  down into 
elementary,  equally  likely events.  In such cases the true probability  dis- 
tribution  is undefined. 
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expectations  assumption.  My aim is only to caution  against  being  carried 
away  by it. 
Poole then criticizes  the econometric  model builders  by invoking  the 
efficient-market  results  directly.  He challenges  forecasters  who purport  to 
predict  more  accurately  than  the market-as reflected  in futures  prices-to 
use their predictions  to speculate  and make money. Specifically,  he ex- 
amines  the bond market  and argues  that equations  of the type used by 
Modigliani  and Shiller  are inconsistent  with an efficient  market.  I would 
stress  that  this  analysis  ignores  risk  aversion.  To arbitrage  the bond  market 
would  require  vast  resources.  The large  corporations  and financial  institu- 
tions certainly  talk as if they are concerned  with risk. Divergences  from 
market  efficiency  may  remain  because  it is not worth  the risk  of arbitraging 
them. 
On the more general  question  of using the information  generated  by 
futures  markets,  I think  Poole's  point  is well  taken  in many  cases.  However, 
there  are different  uses for price  equations.  For example,  a model of the 
world  copper  industry  that  I helped  to build  contains  a price  equation  that 
is not particularly  suited  to making  price  predictions  for speculative  pur- 
poses.  The aim,  rather,  was to run some "what-if"  simulations  of possible 
policy  changes  by the Chilean  government.  Admittedly,  we were  overtaken 
by events  in Chile;  but the point  is that  such  questions  cannot  be answered 
by futures  markets.  Many of the macro  model builders  are in a similar 
game.  They  wish  to explore  the consequences  of policy  changes,  structural 
changes,  and various  kinds  of "what-if"  experiments. 
Poole  goes on to discuss  evidence  that  the ex ante  real  rate  of interest  has 
remained  constant.  Having rejected  the possibility  that a flat LM curve 
gave  rise  to this  constancy,  he suggests  that  it resulted  from  a flat IS curve. 
If both curves  move around  over the cycle, why must we conclude  that 
either  curve  is flat?  In particular,  my reading  of the evidence  from invest- 
ment  functions  does not suggest  a flat IS curve-certainly  not in the short 
run. Perhaps  the movements  in the LM curve  caused  by monetary  policy 
or by international  capital  flows  have  led to the observed  constancy. 
Poole turns  to a consideration  of contract  theory  and argues,  I think 
correctly,  that  the implications  of rational  expectations  for the adjustment 
of wages  and  prices  must  be modified  in a world  with  contractual  arrange- 
ments.  He points out that it may be rational  to distinguish,  or to try to 
distinguish,  between  temporary  and  permanent  shifts  in demand  (and  hence 
in equilibrium  values  of wages  and  prices)  and  respond  to the latter  but  not 
the former.  Slow  adjustment,  therefore,  will result  not from  slow diffusion William  Poole  511 
of information  about the current  state of the world, but rather  from a 
correct  view  that the current  state of the world  is temporary. 
Poole  may  be giving  too much  credit  to the new contract  theory  in sug- 
gesting  that  it introduces  the idea of intertemporal  dependence  of demand 
on price.  The Phelps  and Winter  and the Mortensen  papers  in the Phelps 
volume  also do this. 
William  Poole: I believe  that the evidence  is not consistent  with Baily's 
comment  that  occasional  destabilizing  speculative  "panics"  may  be an im- 
portant  feature  of actual  behavior.  In a world  in which  runs  of speculative 
behavior  occur,  the variance  of n-period  price  changes-where n is chosen 
so that  the runs  have  had sufficient  time  to reverse  themselves-will be less 
than  n times  the variance  of one-period  price  changes.  The empirical  work 
with which  I am familiar  does not support  this hypothesis. 
I  am  also  unconvinced  by  Phelps'  war  story.  I still  believe  that  the  Friedman- 
Phelps  theory  cannot, by itself, generate  serial  correlation  in unemploy- 
ment  unless  contracts  or some other  mechanisms  are introduced.  The war 
story rightly  points out that, if up-side and down-side  risks are asym- 
metrical,  rational  expectations  can generate  a run of errors  in the same 
direction.  Thus, in such a world, one might well find longer and more 
frequent  strings  of pluses  (or minuses)  than would  emerge  from  Ripping  a 
coin. But when  the low-probability  event  occurs  (in Phelps'  story,  the end 
of the war),  it produces  a big  surprise  and  hence  a large  error  in the opposite 
direction.  That  large  error  would  tend to offset  the whole  previous  run of 
small  errors.  In such a world,  any test that took into account  the size as 
well as the direction  of changes  should show no serial dependence.  In 
particular,  the autocorrelation  of the unemployment  rate would be zero, 
rather  than  significantly  positive  as it is in fact.  Autocorrelation  rather  than 
runs  tests are appropriate  because  the theory  is based  on expected  values 
rather  than  expected  directions  of changes. 
General  Discussion 
Several  participants  suggested  amendments  and  qualifications  to Poole's 
views  on the scope and significance  of the rational-expectations  approach. 
Otto Eckstein  felt that there  was an overemphasis  on the term  structure 
of interest  rates  as a "laboratory"  for tests about  expectations.  While  low 
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the markets  for government  bills and securities  generate  a consistent  yield 
curve,  other markets,  even markets  for industrial  bonds, have different 
participants,  who use different  sources  of information,  and  have  different 
expectations  and different  assessments  of risks.  And other  markets  differ 
more  drastically  in many  dimensions. 
Eckstein  noted that commodities-futures  markets  cover only a limited 
range  of products  and,  as a result,  have  only  limited  usefulness  to a macro- 
economist.  He also said that he found  it hard  to believe  that the intensive 
processing  of information  in a full-scale  econometric  model would add 
nothing  to the information  available  to the units in the economy.  If this 
were  true,  macroeconomics  could  be terminated  as a field  of study.  Arthur 
Okun  questioned  Poole's  notion of the appropriate  scope for forecasting. 
He observed  that Poole had distinguished  between  forecasting  things  for 
which  futures  markets  exist and those for which  they did not. He felt that 
Poole had come dangerously  close to implying  that if, say, an efficient 
market  was established  that traded  in predictions  of real GNP, nobody 
should  forecast  it any more. Okun  stressed  that attempts  to second-guess 
the market  were  what  caused  it to incorporate  new information. 
Charles  Holt and Paul Samuelson  recounted  instances  in which  people 
had compiled  sustained  records  of successful  speculation.  While  they  both 
accepted  George  Perry's  comment  that these  were  the outliers  in a sample 
of unknown  size, Holt stressed  the success  of some research  efforts  in 
finding  profitable  strategies.  In general,  most participants  agreed  that the 
rational-expectations  paradigm  was appropriate  for auction  markets. 
Robert  Solow contended  that only for such organized  auction  markets 
was it legitimate  to speak  of and to measure  "the  market's  expectations." 
In contrast,  for things  like the general  price  level,  there  might  be a host of 
different  expectations  that are never  made consistent  by the trading  of a 
piece of paper  in a single  market. 
William  Fellner  cautioned  against  very  narrow  interpretations  of rational 
expectations  that had unnecessarily  extreme  implications.  The notion of 
rationality  presented  in the paper  does not seem  grounded  upon a decision 
theory  that  is based  upon  probability  distributions  and  utility  functions.  It 
proceeds  as if people can enjoy infinite  diversification  costlessly  so that 
variance  does  not affect  them.  It is this  feature  that  leads  to the  proposition 
about  the  flat  IS curve:  such  a curve  implies  the possibility  of changing  the 
asset mix of the public  via monetary  and fiscal  policy without  changing 
relative  rates  of return  among  assets.  The same feature  also leads to the 
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appropriate  unbiased  guide  to prices  in the future.  Thomas  Juster  under- 
scored  the point  that  expectations  are  not a single  number  but have  a vari- 
ance, which is in principle  measurable.  Michael  Wachter  said that the 
liquidity  premium  or risk  factor  might  be sufficiently  difficult  to estimate 
that the term  structure  of interest  rates  could not be utilized  to generate 
forecasts  of future  long rates. 
Poole  responded  to some of these  issues.  He recognized  the existence  of 
market  research,  risk  premiums,  liquidity  considerations,  and  the like; but 
he felt that  they  explained  only a tiny  portion  of the variance  of prices.  For 
example,  because  of risk and liquidity  premiums,  the yield on common 
stocks  may well be greater  than that on Treasury  bills over  the long run; 
and  yet that  difference  in yield  is very  small  compared  with  the variance  of 
ex post yields  on stocks resulting  from variations  in their prices.  Hence, 
Poole  doubted  that  much  additional  explanatory  power  could  accrue  from 
taking  risk aversion  into account.  Furthermore,  he had more confidence 
in expectations  that  were  imbedded  in futures  markets  than  those  reported 
in survey  data. In general,  he found it useful to stress  new information, 
rather  than  the working  out of the lags of the past, as the basic  source  of 
fluctuations  in prices.  The major  story lies in surprises  rather  than long 
distributed  lags, he concluded. 
The remainder  of the discussion  focused  on the macro  implications  of 
the  paper.  Robert  Hall  noted  that,  of the equations  that appear  in a typical 
macro  model,  expectations  play  a major  role  in five:  the Phillips  curve,  the 
relation  between  real and nominal  interest  rates,  the term  structure  of in- 
terest  rates,  the consumption  function  (in the permanent-income  version), 
and  the investment  function  (through  expected  demand).  These  are  treated 
econometrically  through  distributed  lags; and, as Poole pointed  out, that 
treatment  is inconsistent  with  rational  expectations.  To Hall,  the key ques- 
tion was: In comparing  models based on rational  expectations  and on 
distributed  lags, what  is the difference  in the responses,  especially  with  re- 
spect  to shocks  and to changes  in fiscal  and monetary  policy?  He wished 
that  Poole,  in his excellent  summary  of current  thought,  had tried  to reach 
some overall  conclusion  on that issue. 
Hall was also concerned  that the paper  may have given an incorrect 
impression  that an explicit expectations  variable  was necessary  to deal 
econometrically  with expectations;  for most purposes,  Hall felt, it would 
suffice  to treat  expectations  as unobserved  variables  that merely  have the 
property  of not containing  serially  correlated  errors. 
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cycle  mainly  to supply  factors-especially,  errors  in predicting  prices  and 
wages-and thus relegated  aggregate  demand  to a minor role. Feldstein 
suspected  that  this  framework  slighted  the importance  of the basic  Keynes- 
ian insights  about the significance  of shifts in aggregate  demand.  After 
some  discussion,  it was  generally  agreed  that Poole's  formulation  could  be 
viewed  as an attempt  to explain  why supply  shifts  failed  to offset  demand 
shifts,  thereby  producing  the observed  cyclical  pattern  of output  and em- 
ployment.  Hall noted that the rational-expectations  approach  had to in- 
voke  long informational  lags, often  three  or more  years,  to account  for the 
cycle and the persistence  of unemployment.  Martin  Baily  joined Hall in 
finding  such  long lags  implausible.  Baily  rejected  the view  that  people  were 
rational  and yet took three  years  to read  the information  on the financial 
pages  of their  daily  newspapers.  Lawrence  Klein  pointed  out that it made 
a big difference  whether  information  comes out all at once or builds up 
gradually  over the hypothetical  three-year  period. Distributed-lag  effects 
are felt, in part, at an early stage. It is only for the buildup  of the full 
effect  that long periods  are required. 
Wachter,  Hall, and R. J. Gordon then focused on the question of 
whether,  if one accepted  the long informational  lags in the rational-expec- 
tations  approach,  that  model  was  empirically  distinguishable  from  the con- 
tracts  approach.  Gordon  remarked  that information  about  the same  event 
must reach  various  markets  essentially  simultaneously;  this implied  that 
any  demonstration  that  some  sectors  of the economy  respond  more  rapidly 
to events  than  others  would  be evidence  in favor  of the contracts  approach. 